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Following  rapid deterioration  in the macroeconomic  and sectoral performance  in Sub-Saharan
Africa (SSA) since the mid-1970s,  reaching crisis proportions  in the early 1980s,  many countries in
the region started eomprehensive  World Bank (and IMF) adjustment  lending programs.  Most of these
countries started the adjustment  process from a position  of (i) low and declining  real income, (ii)
sluggish  or deteriorating  growth rates; (iii) mounting externpl  debt and debt service, (iv) very low
saving and investment  to GDP ratios, (v) declining  external competitiveness  and growth in export
volumes, (vi) mounting  current account  deficits (without  compensating  foreign capital inflows) and
(vii) rapidly declining  agricultural  output per capita.
Also, many countries  started the adjustment  process with highly overvalued real exchange
rates, a condition  resulting from many years of inflationary  policies, inward-oriented  trade strategies,
and policies which encouraged  excessive  capital inflows. Furthermore, in the period prior to the start
of adjustment  programs, many countries were experiencing  widespread  inefficiencies  in resource use
due to import restrictions (import quotas and tariffs), high commodity  export taxes, administered
interest rates and foreign exchange  controls. Inappropriate  policies which resulted in relative price
distortions  in most of the key sectors adversely affected  economic  incentives  and production. These
price distortions  combined  with the severe external shocks  of the late 1970s  and early 1980s
(declining  terms of trade, drying up of foreign capital inflows  and rising world interest rates),
considerably  weakened  many economies  of SSA in the early 1980s.
There is very little disagreement  regarding  the severity  of the economic  crisis facing most
African countries. However, there is considerable  controversy  regarding the causes of such poor
economic  performance. One school of thought  blames forces beyond the control of economic  policy
makers in the region for the poor performance. Adverse terms-of-trade  shocks, limited access to
foreign credit, declining  demand for African commodities,  and severe droughts are cited as
contributing  to the slow growth. However, both faster growth of low-income  countries in other
regions (e.g., South Asia) that have faced similar external conditions  as SSA and better performance
m SSA in earlier periods (with similar external  shocks)  have led another school of thought to focus on
the contribution  of domestic  policies to economic  problems  in the region.
What make the economies  of SSA particularly vulnerable  to exogenous  shocks and natural
disasters are the peculiar conditions  prevailing in SSA - including  the rudimentary  nature of its
infrastructure,  its limited technological  base, and the structural disarticulation  of its economies  with
domestic production  almost totally dependent  on imported  capital and intermediate  goods, while the
main source of foreign exchange  remains a handful  of primary exports most of which are agricultural
and produced  under increasingly  distressed eavironmental  conditions. These considerations  motivated-2  -
some scholars to argue that what is required for SSA is a development  strategy that has a balanced
emphasis  on both demand management  and economic  restructuring,  that emphasizes  longer term
horizon, ensures ste".y flow of much needed  capital and fosters stability  and sustainability. The
proponents  of this strategy (e.g. Helleiner  (1990)) argue that this is the appropriate  strategy for SSA
even if it should entail  some marginal  deviations  from etficiency  pricing ol equilibrium  real exchange
rates.  There is a wide agreement, however, that policies leading to unstable macroeconomic
environment,  elaborate controls, and substantially  sub-optimal  incentive  structure are harmful to
growth.  Subject  to the above caveats - which are quite relevant for the case of SSA, the ultimate
proposition  that "nations  control their own economic  destiny" (Summers  (1992)) remains  valid in SSA
as is everywhere.
Programs of structural adjustment  lending (SAL)  and sectoral adjustment  lending (SECAL)
were introduced  in the early 1980s  in SSA in order to help countries in the region minimize the initial
costs of stabilization while implementing  economic  policy and institutional  reforms.  The policy
prescriptions  in SALs and SECALs strongly emphasize  the adoption  of outward-oriented  development
strategies as the primary channel for eliminating  balance of payments  and debt problems. Nominal
devaluations,  macroeconomic  retrenchment  and reforms in foreign trade and institutions  are the main
vehicles for eliminating  overvaluations  in the real exchange  rates and creating a structure of incentives
consistent  with this strategy. Adjustment  loans to SSA have accounted  for a large proportion of
World Bank adjustment  loans - of the 183 SALs and SECALs  as of 1989, SSA accounted  for 84.
The aims of this study were to investigate  the factors influencing  participation  in World Bank
adjustment  lending in SSA and all low income countries  (LICs) and to estimate the contribution  of
World Bank adjustment  programs on economic  performance  in these two regions.  Each of the two
groups of countries (SSA and LICs) was divided into three categories: the early intensive adjustment
lending (EIAL) countries were those that received  two or more SALs or three adjustment  loans (SALs
or SECALs)  before 1986; the other adjustment  lending (OAL) countries  were those that started
adjustment  after 1985  or received  fewer than two SALs or three adjustment  loans prior to 1985; and
the countries  that did not receive adjustment  lendings  between 1980 and 1988 (NAL). In the analysis
the latter two groups were defined as non-adjustors. Three periods were used for the evaluations  of
conditions  prior to the decision  to participate  in adjustment  programs and for the analysis  of the
effectiveness  of programs on economic  performance  - 1970-80; 1981-84;  and 1985-89.1
X Only  two low-income  countries  outside  SSA  were included  in the category  EAIL  LUCs.  Hence, in effect, an assessment  of
the effectiveness  of adjustment  in the EAIL LICa  essentiatly  provides  an assessment  for the EAIL  countries  from SSA.-3-
At the outset we hasten to point out that while  this classification  process is based on a rather
objective criterion and therefore avoids subjective  Judi  nment,  it does not, however, account  for actual
implementation  of the programs.  Strictly speaking,  therefore, the above classification  allows for
testing the effectiveness  of Bank-assisted  adjustment  lending  rather t,.an testing the effectiveness  of the
program themselves. To be able to do this the current classification  should be augmented  with a
somewhat  'subjective' but informed  criterion specifying  the degree of program implementation.
While this should be an important  future extension  of the research 2; in this study, however, we will
assume  that the present 'objective' classification  criteria are adequate  for 'approximately' assessing  the
effectiveness  of the adjustment  programs.
An evaluation  of the initial conditions  in the period 1970-80  revealed  that Sub-Saharan
countries in the categories  EAIL and OAL had pursued more expansive  macroeconomic  policies than
the NAL countries. The countries in these two groups experienced  higher inflation rates than NAL
countries. Also, the EAIL and OAL countries  had higher debt burdens than NAL countries. In
addition, in the period 1970-80,  the NAL countries outperformed  the EAIL and OAL countries  in
terms of real economic  growth despite comparable  investment  ratios across these three groups of
countries. Hence, it is clear that the group of countries  that undertook  Bank-assisted  adjustment
(compared  with the NAL countries)  entered the 1980s  with relatively  weaker economies. In the
period 1981-84  (compared  to 1970-80),  both the real GDP growth and the investment  ratio of the
EAIL and NAL countries  deteriorated and the growth rate for the OAL countries  stagnated
A probit analysis  of factors influencing  the decision  to participate  in adjustment  programs
point to the importance  of the macroeconomic  policies, economic  performance,  and political stability
in the period preceding adjustment. However, the extent of the external shocks  do not seem to matter
in making  such a decision. The results show a very strong positive relationship  between political
stability (in the period prior to the start of intensive adjustrnent,  1981-84)  and the decision  of
countries in SSA to participate  in adjustment  programs.  Hence, countries  (such as Mauritius,
Senegal, Cote d'Ivoire, Kenya, Nigeria and so on) which were relatively  more stable politically  in the
period 1981-84  (than countries  such as Burundi, Central African  Republic, Congo, Mali, Niger,
Somalia, Zaire, Benin, Cameroon, Ethiopia  and so on) were more inclined  to start the adjustment
procsss early and to undertake strong and bold adjustment  measures. This result has two important
implications. First, political stability is important  to the recognition  of the need for adjustment.
Second, an increase in political instability  can potentially  jeopardize the sustainability  of adjustment
programs.  Other factors (in the period prior to the start of intensive adjustment)  which were
2 This will be one of the major  methodological  extensions  in a forthcoming  Bank study  on Adjustment  in Sub-Sahamn  Africa
(Jones  (1992)).-4-
important  in inducing  countries in SSA to participate  in adjustment  lending  programs were the (i) the
growth performance,  (ii) investment  to GDP ratio, and (iii) foreign debt burden.
Virtually similar results were obtained  for all low income countries  which participated  in
World Bank adjustment  lending. In addition, for these countries, a rise in in-flation  (in the period
prior to the start of intensive  adjustment)  was an important  factor leading to the decision  to participate
in adjustment  lending. However, neither for countries in SSA nor for all low-income  countries was
there any significant  association  between external  shocks and the decision to participate  in adjustment
lending  programs.  These last two results indicate  that the pre-reform macroeconomic  stability
(reflected in the degree of inflation)  is an important  factor leading countries  to participate  in
adjustment  lending programs.  However, the change in external  shocks is not important  in this
decision - at least in a direct sense.
Another aim of the study was to investigate  the contribution  of World Bank adjustment
lending to five indicators  of performance:  export to GDP ratio; growth in real GDP; gross domestic
investment  to GDP ratio; saving to GDP ratio; and inflation. The adjustment  period was defined as
1985-89  and the pre-adjustment  period as 1981-84. The change in the indicators of performance
between  these two periods were considered. A comparison  of the means  of economic  performance
indicators  for EIAL countries  between  the periods 1981-84  and 1985-89  (periods before and after
World Bank adjustment  programs were started) revealed  improvements  in real GDP growth, export to
GDP ratio and saving to GDP ratio, and a fall in inflation. 3 Real GDP growth rose from 0.1 percent
to 3.7 percent.  Export to GDP ratio rose from 27.7 percent to 29.6 percent.  Saving to GDP ratio
rose from 9.9 percent to 11 percent.  Inflation  fell from 21 percent to 15 percent. However, real
GDP growth, investment  to GDP ratio and export  to GDP ratio fell in both the OAL and NAL
countries. NAL countries  experienced  a substantial  increase  in saving to GDP ratio and a large fall in
inflation.
However, the comparison  of economic  indicators  before and after adjustment  programs were
started does not give an accurate  picture of the true contribution  of these programs.  Hence, an
econometric  methodology  was used to separate out the contribution  of World Bank adjustment
programs. The modified-control-group  statistical  framework  was used for the analysis. This method
of analysis  is capable  of identifying  the 'marginal'  (incremental)  contribution  of World Bank
adjustment  lending  on economic  performance  after (i) accounting  for the potential endogeneity  of the
decision  to participate  in adjustment  programs, (ii) controlling  for factors unrelated  to programs which
could also affect performance,  and (iii) incorporating  the performance  of countries  which did not
3 These  findings  am in lin.  ith  those  of another  Word Bark  sdy  using  a simiar  metdology  for EIAL SPA (Special
Prject for Africa)  countries  (World  Bank 1991a).-5 -
undergo adjustment  but which faced mor-or-less similar external  shocks as those that did participate
in adjustment  (to obtain a counterfactual  of what could  have happened  in the absence  of programs).
In the case of countries  in SSA  there is strong indication  that World Bank adjustment
programs have contributed  to improving  exports in a signiflcant  way.  This result is not surprising
given that most of the countries  concerned  took strong and bold policy actions  to implement  policy
changes in their exchange  rates and trade sectors.  he rate of implementation  of trade-related  or
exchange  rate policies in SSA was high compared to other policy areas.  The success  of adjustment
programs depend  to a large extent on the credibility  of such programs.  Strong, bold and sustained
policy and institutional  reforms not only improve incentives  in the tradables sector but also enhance
the credibility  of programs.
However, World Bank adjustment  lending has not significantly  affected economic  growth 4
and has contributed  to a statistically  significant  drop in investment  ratio.  Two implications  follow
from these two results combined. First, any increase in the efficiency  of investment  generated  by
reform programs has not been sufficient  to counterbalance  the ensuing decline  in investment  and to
restore economic  growth.  Part of the decline in investment  may have been caused  by the slowdown
of the large-scale  government  investment  programs in face of retrenchment. Second, more attention
should be given to private sector perception  about the credibility  of reforms and hence to its likely
response  to policy reforms (designed  to enhance  private sector investment). Also, adjustmrent  lending
programs did not significantly  affect inflation  or saving to GDP ratio.
There are several reasons for the lack of full desirable impact  of adjustment  programs on all
indicators  of performance. First, after years of distortions  in relative prices, it takes time for factors
of production  to identify more productive  opportunities  and to ultimately  make the shift.  Second,
SSA has had below average success with the implementation  of conditions  in adjustment  programs
(than countries in other regions). The lack of full implementation  of conditions  might have
jeopardized  the credibility of reforms. Investor uncertainty  about  the implementation  and
sustainability  of adjustment  programs are a major impediment  to supply response. Several countries
in SSA (Burkina  Faso, Equatorial Guinea, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and Zimbabwe,) abandoned  their
efforts towards adjustment  after one or two initial loans.  Also, the adjustment  programs may have
been too ambitious  and included  too many conditions  thus jeopb.iizing their sustainability. Third,
some of the special structural characteristics  of the countries  undergoing  adjustment  in SSA (such as
poor infrastructure, low level of education,  and lack of institutions)  may have prevented  the full
4Using  a similar  statistical  methodology  to our though  a different  basw  period, the Third  Repoit  on Adjustment  Lending  (RAL
Hi, 1992),  however,  concludes  that  adjustmnt  has restored  growth  in SSA to the moderate  levels of the 1970s. Still, the
majority  view in the intemational  development  community,  including  the Bank, is that there  is much to be desired  in terms  of
restoring  growth  and social welfare  to Sub-Sahamn  Africa  (e.g. Summon  (1992)).-6 -
desired  response  to price incentives  and improved  economic  policies. Fourth,  the failure  of structural
adjustment  to restore  growth  in Sub-Saharan  Africa  may  be due more  to a possible  decline  in capacity
utilization  induced  by the import  compression  precipitated  by the fiscal  and monetary  retrenchment
required  by the programs,  rather  than  because  of simple  declines  in capacity  growth. This
explanation  is due  to Ndulu  (1991)  who  argues  that, given  the imperfect  substitutability  between
imported  intermediate  goods  and  domestically  -! aduced  goods  in most  of the economies  of SSA,  the
le,!el  of imports  could  be a reasonable  approximate  measure  for capacity  utilization  in SSA.
The results  of this study  are somewhat  encouraging  in that  the marginal  contribution  of Bank-
supported  adjustment  programs  to export  performance  has been  positive  and significant,  given  the
potentially  important  positive  inter-linkages  between  export  growth  and overall  economic  growth. 5
On the other  hand,  the findings  that  adjustment  programs  have  not significantly  affected  overall
economic  growth  in SSA  and  have  had  a deleterious  effect  on investment,  lend  credence  to those  who
call for more  explicit  considerations  of the peculiar  initial  conditions  of the economies  of SSA  in the
design,  emphasis  and  time horizon  of the adjustment  programs  recommended  for SSA  (e.g. Helleiner
op. cit.). In order  to facilitate  the process  of smooth  and  efficient  allocation  of resources,  a redefined
but important  role for governments  in reforming  African  economies  is in order. While  fiscal  and
monetary  retrenchment  are still indispensable  for the success  of reforms,  more  public  investment  on
infrastructure,  human  capital  and agricultural  technology  is particularly  critical  for generating  supply
response  in SSA. Furthermore,  efforts  need  to be made  to raise  the credibility  (to the private  sector)
of policy  reforms  and  to enhance  the degree  of program  implementation.  Also,  our results  clcarly
show  the critical  role (of the politically-sensitive  issue)  of "governance"6  and  political  stability  in
influencing  adoption,  implementation,  sustainability  and credibility  of adjustmnent  programs.
5 Though  there is growing  evidence  of a stable  positive  relationship  between  openness  (or even expoits  growth  - an indicator
of 'revealed' policy)  and overall  economic  growth  for developing  countries  as a group, there  is Considerablo  skepticism  about
the strength  of thi, relationship  for SSA (see for example  the survey  paper by Helleiner  (1991)). More recently,  however,
Matin  (1992)  finds  strong and robust  evidence  on a positive  relationship  between  economic  perfornance and openness  in SSA.
He explains  his findings  by that unlie the previous  cross-section  estimation  with  period  average  data, his pane data analysis
using a fixed  effect  model  avoids  obscuring  the significant  changes  in openness  that have  occurred  over  the last decade  in SSA.
Moreover,  he argued  that the cross-section  estimation  fails to control  for unobserved  country-specific  differences  that can bias
the coefficients'  estimates.
6  A broad  definition  of the term  governance"  is given by Landell-Mills  and Serageldin  (1991)  as "tC'e  use of political  authority
and exercise  of control ovor a society  and the management  of its resources  for social and economic  development".  Also see the
above  reference  on further elaboration  on the meaning  of governance,  characteristics  df good governance  and means  of
fostoring  good governance,  among  other  issues.-7-
2.  INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decides a number  of factors (including  economic  mismanagement,  fall in
terms-of-trade,  the weather and political instability)  have adversely affected  economic  performance  in
Sub-Saharan  Africa (SSA). Among all the develop'  -g regions of the world, SSA has been the most
unstable  politically (plagued  by coups, civil strife, ethnic violence, border conflicts and secessionist
wars).  Many governments  has taxed farmers' output at high rates both directly through inefficiently
run state marketing  boards and indirectly  by overvalued real exchange  rates.  Since independence,
many countries  have assigned  low priority to agriculture. As a consequence  of the lack of political
stability and accountability  and the lack of proper economic  incentives  economic  performance  has
deteriorated.
The economic  malaise  facing SSA is serious.  ALer an impressive  start at independence,  SSA
is today the poorest and least developed  region in the world and it is getting poorer with time.  About
three fourths of the countries in the region are classified in the low-income  category. Furthermore, of
all the developing  regions in the world, SSA is the most overburdened  by foreign debt, the most
dependent  on foreign financial and technical  assistance, the most dependent  on food aid and imported
food, and has the worst record on social indicators. In the mid-1950s, SSA was essentially  self-
sufficient  in food and some countries  were even exporting  foodstuff. Since the 1960s,  however, food
production  per capita in the region has been dropping at an alarming  rate.  Tcday, malnutrition,
starvation and child mortality is widespread  throughout  the region.
The economic  deterioration  reached alarming  proportions  in the late 1970s  and by the early
1980s  many countries attempted  to reverse their economic  downfall  through economic  policy reforms
assisted  by the World Bank and the International  Monetary  Fund (IMF) (and other multilateral  and
bilateral agencies). The need for major change in the economic  environment  of these countries
became clear in the early 1980s  following  rapid deterioration in their sectoral and overall economic
performance  and a significant  decline  in the standard  of livitg of their citizens. Most countries  had
experienced  a steady downtrend in their real income  per capita since the mid-1970s,  and in the early
1980s  the income levels in many countries  had fallen to alarmingly  low levels.  Most other major
indicators of macroeconomic  performance  (saving, investment  and trade) had shown signs of
considerable  weakness  and deterioration  since the mid-1970s.
Inappropriate  policies coupled with the lack of diversity in the export  base for many  countries
in SSA have left many countries extremely  vulnerable  to external shocks and the vagaries of weather.
The failure of many countries throughout  the 1970s  and early 1980s  to accommodate  the adverse
effects of negative  external shocks  have compounded  the negative impact  of these shocks. By the
early 1980s, it became clear that most of the adverse  external shocks (deteriorating  terms-of-trade,
drying up of foreign capital and increase in international  real interest rate) were of a long term nature-8-
and that countries  would have to adjust.  Hence, by the beginning  of 1980s, many countries  realized
the urgent need for economic  policy reforms to address short-term balance  of payments crises and
medium to long term productivity  improvements.
World Bank structural adjustment  programs were designed  to enable countries  reform their
policies in order to boost the structure of incen',ves and raise the profitability  of the various sectors
without  unduly high reductions  in consumptdon  per capita  during the initial  stages of the programs.
Structural adjustment  programs consist of policy reforms aimed both at stabilizing  the macroeconomy
to bring aggregate  demand more in line with available  resources and at eliminating  the gaps between
prices and social marginal  costs at the sectoral level. These programs generally  emphasize  outward-
oriented trade strategies. It is expected  that economic  agents  will react favorably  to such incentives
and improved economic  enviromnent  by investing  in the tradables sector of the economy, thus linking
adjustment  and growth.
At the end of 1989, 28 countries  in SSA had active Bank-supported  adjustment  programs, and
27 had IMF programs (World Bank 1991a, p. 7).  A few studies  have been conducted  to investigate
the effectiveness  of adjustmnent  programs in a diverse group of developing  countries (World Bank
1988a  and 1990a;  Faini et al. 1990; Conway 1991; Khan 1990). However, there has been little done
in the way of understanding  both the factors leading  to participation  in adjustment  programs and the
effectiveness  of these programs in the sole context of SSA.
The aims of this study are four-fold. First, an analysis  of the nature of the economic  and
social crisis is performed.  Also, the causes of the crisis  are discussed. One of the main conclusions
of the later section is that unsustainable  macroeconomic,  exchange  rate and trade policies were
responsible  in important  ways for the economic  decline, however, the peculiar conditions  of the
economies  of SSA should be explicitly  incorporated  in the design of a future economic  reform and
development  strategy for SSA.'  Second, an analysis  of the factors influencing  a country's
participation  in adjustment  programs is performed. The third aim of the study is to econometrically
investigate  the effectiveness  of World Bank adjustment  programs. The modified-control-group
approach (World Bank 1990a,  pp. 23-25) is used as a statistical  technique  for analysis. However, the
present study goes beyond the analysis  of the World Bank report by incorporating  non-economic  but
important  determinants  of economic  performance  such as political stability  and internal shocks  (e.g.
droughts). Furthermore, the statistical  framework  used for identifying  and estimating  marginal
program effects allows for formal testing of the model restrictions  regarding the participation
7 Tne foahcoMing  African  Adjustment  Study  (Jones  (1992)),  will attempt  to examine  the validity  of the critique  leveled  at the
eform  progams,  in order to as  tho  need  for and  the,  extet of the  equired  changes  to those  programs.-9  -
decisions  in the adjustment  programs. Finally,  the results  of this study  are used  to draw  broad  policy
conclusions  about  future  adjustment  programs,  which  are presented  in the previous  section.- 10-
3.  NATURE OF THE CRISIS
Most countries in SSA have now experienced  about two decades  of steady deterioration in
their aggregate  economic  performance. This section  discusses  the nature and dimensions  of the
macroeconomic  crisis in the region.
3.1  Declining Real Income and Sluggish Growth
Perhaps the most dramatic deterioration  in economic  performance  is indicated  by the stagnant
or rapid fall in the real income per capita since the mid-1970s  (Figure 3.1).  Since the beginning  of
the 1980s, real income  per capita  has experienced  a downward  trend in SSA, while low-income
developing  economies  in other regions of the world have witnessed  a continuous  upward trend in their
real income per capita. In fact, while real income  per capita in all developing  countries as a group
has doubled  between  the early 1970s  and tbe late 1980s,  real income  per capita in SSA has fallen
back to about the same level as it was in the early 1970s. Eight countries (Chad, Ghana, Liberia,
Madagascar,  Niger, Uganda, Zaire and Zambia)  experienced  severe drop in real income per capita of
more than 20 percent between  the early 1970s  and late 1980s.
The start of the economic  crisis in SSA which coincides  with the first oil shock of 1973  has
intensified  after the second oil shock of 1979. Hence, between 1980 and 1987  the real income  per
capita fell by about a quarter in SSA whereas South Asia and all low-income  developing  economies
experienced  28 and 35 percent rise respectively  in the same variable. In certain countries (such as
Zambia, Liberia, Nigeria, and Sao Tome/Principe)  real income  per capita  dropped by more than a
quarter between 1980  and 1987. However, not all countries experienced  a fall in their real income
per capita. Between  1960 and 1987, six countries  (Botswana,  Burundi, Congo, Lesotho, Mauritius
and Swaziland)  had been successful  at more than doubling  their real income per capita. Seven other
countries (Cameroon,  Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon, Kenya, Malawi, Seychelles  and Togo) managed to raise
their real income  per capita  by at least 50 percent in the same time span.
Growth in real GNP per capita in SSA lagged behind other developing  regions of the world in
the 1960s, 1970s  and 1980s  (Table 3.1).  In the period 1960-89,  the real GNP per capita grew at 1.6
percent in South Asia and only at 0.4 percent in SSA. Certain countries  (such as Ghana, Sierra
Leone, Sudan, Madagascar,  Zaire, Niger, Senegal,  Benin and Mauritania)  experienced  poor growth
continuously. However, the performance  in terms of per capita growth was not uniformly  poor either
across countries or over time.  The average annual  per capita growth  rates in Botswana,  Burundi,
Congo, Lesotho, Swaziland,  and Seychelles  and to some extent in Mauri"us, Cameroon, and Kenya
were outstanding  in the three decades investigated.
Also, the very poor growth performance  of several countries in SSA in the 1980s  should be
contrasted  with the relatively good performance  of these countries  soon after independence  in the- 11  -
period 1960-70  when they experienced  positive growth rates. The economic  crisis in SSA became
more apparent in the ,980s after the second oil shock when more than half of the countries in the
region experienced  negative  growth rates in real GNP per capita. The region as a whole experienced
a negative  growth rate of -1.6 percent in the period 1980-86  whereas all low-income  developing
economies  in South Asia experienced  a respectable  growth rate of 2.7 percent in the same period.
The situation deteriorated  further in the period 1986-89  when the growth rate of all countries in SSA
was -1.7 percent whereas the South Asian economies  grew at an impressive  rate of 3.6 percent and all
low income economies  as group grew at 4.2 percent.
3.2  Declining Investment and Saving
The gross domestic investment  ratio which rose almost continuously  from 1970 to 1976 to
reach 23 percent of GDP started a downturn  since then to attain a minimum  of about 15 percent in
1989 (Figure 3.2).  The poor performance  of the investment  ratio can be contrasted with the more-or-
less continuous  upward trend in that variable in other developing  regions of the world (namely, low-
income developing  economies)  over most of the period 1970-89.
The domestic saving ratio was very erratic in SSA throughout  the 1970s  and 1980s  (Figure
3.3).  This is to be contrasted with the generally  upward trend in that variable in other low-income
regions. After reaching a high rate of 23.2 percent of GDP in 1974, the general trend in the saving
rate in SSA has been a downward  one since then to hit an all time low of 9.8 percent in 1983.
Although  there was a slight recovery in the saving rate in the following  years, its level remained  very
low in SSA in comparison  with other low-income  regions.  Hence, the saving rate in South Asia
which was slightly lower than that in SSA in 1970  (at 14.3 percent) caught up with its counterpart  in
SSA by the beginning  of the 1980s  to reach about 18 percent by the late 1980s  and stabilized  at
approximately  that level throughout  the 1980s. The rapid decline in the saving ratio in the 1980s
coincides with the drying up of capital inflows into the region.
3.3  Deteriorating Export Performance  and Current Account Balance
The poor macroeconomic  performance  is closely  related to the region's poor export
performance  and the large current account deficits. In 1988, SSA with a population  of about 464
millions had exported about  the same dollar value of goods and services as Austria with a population
of only 7.6 millions.  A recent study by Svedberg  (1991) finds that most countries in SSA had poor
export  performance  in the period 1970-85  in the three dimensions  examined:  (i) relative to LDCs, (ii)
in absolute  terms, (iii) and compared  to own performance  in an earlier period (1954-69). His
findings are confirmed  by the data in Tables 3.2a-3.2e which summarize  the aggregate  and
agricultural  export performance.- 12 -
After an impressive  export performance  in the late 1960s  and early 1970s  relative to other
low-income  regions, the export volume in SSA followed  a general downward  trend since then to
reach an all time low in 1982 (Figure 3.4).  Between  the periods 1965-80  and 1980-88  the growth of
exports in SSA fell from 6.1 percent, the best and strongest among all developing  regions, to -0.7
percent CFable  3.2a).  From Table 3.2b it is clear that countries in SSA have lost about 70 percent of
their world and LDC total export share between 1950 and the late 1980s. The share of African  total
exports in world total exports fell from 3.3 percent in 1950  to 1.0 percent in 1988. The drop was
very fast in the 1980s. Hence, between 1980 and 1988, SSA lost 60 percent of its world and LDC
export share.  Also, the share of merchandise  exports in total LDC merchandise  exports (of countries
in SSA as a group) witnessed a fast decline  in the 1980s  whereas low-income  economies  in other
regions saw an improvement  in their export share in the same period (Figure 3.5).  In fact, the low
income economies  of South Asia regained much of the market share in the 1980s  that they had lost in
the 1970s. The gain in their market share for merchandise  exports coincides  with the dramatic loss of
the market share for merchandise  exports from SSA.
The poor performance  of the overall exports sector was closely linked with the very poor
performance  of agricultural commodity  exports (Tables 3.2c-3.2e). Hence, in the period 1970-85,  the
real export growth rates of both food items and agricultural  raw materials  for SSA were considerably
lower than those of the other developing  regions (Fable 3.2c).  Also, SSA's loss of its share of food
exports and exports of agricultural raw materials in total world exports for corresponding  items was
the most dramatic of all developing  regions (Fable 3.2d).  Hence, between  the 1970s  and the 1980s,
SSA's world market share of coffee, cotton, sugar and cocoa shrank by 22, 19, 15 and 12 percent
respectively  (Fable 3.2e).  The poor performance  of the food and agricultural  commodity  exports
from SSA has been an important  factor behind the loss of export shares of these items.
The poor export performance  of SSA relative to other low-income  developing  regions is
reflected in the poor performance  in its current account  balance (as a percentage  of GDP) relative to
other developing  regions (Figure 3.6).  Except for 1974 and 1985, SSA has experienced  larger
current account deficits than other low-income  regions in the period 1970-88. The current account  of
countries  in SSA experienced  tremendous  difficulties  in the 1980s. Thus the deficit for SSA as a
whole rose from 3.9 percent of GDP in the 1970s  to above 6 percent of GDP in the 1980s  - more
than 50 percent increase.
3.4  Mounting Debt Burden
The foreign debt burden of countries  in SSA has historically  been a small fraction of total
debt outstanding  of LDCs (Figure 3.7).  For instance, in 1989  it represented  only 12.8 percent of
total external  debt of LDCs whereas in the same year Latin American debt represented  36.8 percent- 13 -
of LDC debt.  However, on closer look, SSA's debt crisis (as measured  by the total debt to GNP
ratio and the debt service to total export ratio) in the 1980s  was more acute compared  with other
developing regions CTable  3.3 and Figures 3.8 and 3.9).  In 1970  the ratio of total debt to GNP in
SSA was only 14.1 percent compared with 15.4 percent in South Asia and 18.6 in Latin America.
However, by 1980, this ratio had doubled for SSA, whereas it rose only moderately  for South Asia.
At the end of 1989, the debt in SSA was about US$147  billion or about 100 percent of total GDP in
the region and more than three times its export earnings. In that same year the total debt of Latin
American  countries was about US$422 billion or about three times that in SSA.  Yet this debt
represented only about 49 percent of total GNP.  In fact, the proportion of the Latin American  debt to
GNP has been declining  every year since 1985, whereas it has risen very rapidly in SSA since the
early 1980s. In 1988, 16 countries in SSA had a debt to GNP ratio of more than 100 percent (Table
3.3).  In certain countries (Congo, Guinea-Bissau,  Mauritania,  Somalia and Zambia)  the external  debt
owed by each person in 1988 was more than twice the per capita GNP (Table 3.3).
Also, since the late 1970s  there has been a dramatic increase in the debt service as a
percentage  of exports in SSA (Figure 3.9).  The debt service ratio rose from a manageable  4.2
percent in 1974 to an average of 23 percent in 1985. Although  there was a decline  in the debt-service
ratio between 1984  and 1986, and between 1988  and 1989, the average for the whole period of 1980-
89 has remained  very high at about 16.1 percent. The region as a whole has faced great difficulty  in
servicing its debt.  In the past few years, well over three fourths of the countries  in the region have
had to reschedule their debt.
There is some indication  from the above evaluations  of the dimensions  of the crisis that
developing  regions which have maintained  and raised their saving and investment  rates, and raised
their export volume growth, have been successful  at increasing  their real income  per capita. The
economic  distress in SSA is serious.  The poor economic  record poses a serious challenge  to the
development  community  in general and to African  policy makers in particular.  It is the challenge  of
identifying  feasible avenues  to reverse the downward  trend in economic  performance  and promoting
of economic  and social prosperity. It is also the challenge  of finding quick solutions  to the problems
of widecpread  hunger, malnutrition, poverty and infant mortality. In that regard, it is important  to
correctly identify the various causes of the poor economic  record and to take strong and bold actions
to deal with the sources of the crisis which African  policy makers have control over.  It is the aim of
the next section to review the causes of the crisis.- 14 -
4.  CAUSES OF THE CRISIS AND ADJUSTMENT  LENDING
IN SUB-SAHARAN  AFRICA
Since the early 1980s,  two different views of the causes of the African crisis have emerged -
the neoclassical  view on the one hand and the  structuralist  view on the other. 8 In this section we
will provide first a brief overview  of the above two approaches. Appendix  A contains  a detailed
review of these two polar positions and a synthesis  of the two approaches  based on available empirical
evidence. A summary  of this synthesized  view - to which the Bank view seems to be converging
over time, is stated later on in this section. The section closes with a description  of the main
components  of the World Bank Structural Adjustment  Lending  Programs, and the extent of its
adoption  by SSA countries. Appendix  B provides the arguments  on the rationale for these programs.
4.1  Causes of the Crisis
Mkandawire  (1989) has summarized  the main theoretical  underpinnings  of these two different
views of the causes of the crisis:
The structuralist  view is one which highlights  a number of features and "stylized
facts" that at almost every point contradicts  the neoclassical  view - class-based
distribution  of income rather than marginal  productivity  based distribution  of income;
oligopolistic  rather than the laissez-faire  capitalist markets; increasing  returns to scale
or fixed proportions  production  functions  rather than "well-behaved"  production
functions  with decreasing  returns and high rates of substitution;  non-equivalent  or
"unequal  exchange' in the world rather than competitive,  comparative  advantage
based world trade system; low supply elasticities  rather than instantaneous  responses
to price incentives;  etc., (p. 3).
The early official  World Bank's view reported in the Berg Report (World Bank 1981), has
identified  domestic  policy factors as the main cause of the economic  deterioration in SSA. The report
argued that inappropriate  macroeconomic,  exchange rate and trade policies have undermined  the long-
run growth prospects of the countries  in the region.  Also, heavy taxation  of farmers' output has been
responsible  for the poor performance  of the export sector in most countries in SSA. Furthermore,
overextended  public and parastatal  sectors have imposed  heavy pressures  on the domestic  budget
leading to high levels of fiscal deficits. These inappropriate  policies, over protracted  periods of time,
'  In fact this sharp  dieho  V  between  orthodoxy  and structuralist  positions  on Sub-Sahaman  Africa  does not account  for a largo
number  of scholars  whose  viows  of the causes  of the  crisis fall in between  those  two extremes. This  admittedly  oversimplified
set-up  can be helpful  in sharponing  the discussion,  however. Furthermore,  the synthesis  discussion  of appendix  A allows
relaxing  this sharp  distinction.- 15  -
have led to the rapid deterioration  of the agricultural  sector performance,  the key sector in most
African  nations. Also, it has been argued that the lack of an appropriate  exchange  rate policy
framework  in developing  countries  may have compounded  the negative  effects of adverse external
shocks [e.g. Khan 1986, p. 414J. For instance,  the resistance  to nominal  devaluations  of domestic
currencies in the face of deteriorating  terms-of-trade  and drying up of foreign capital led to extended
periods of overvaluation  of the real exchange rates in many countries  in SSA in the early 1980s.
The main proponent  of the structuralist  view, the Organization  for African Unity (OAU) has
voiced its position in the 1980 Lagos Plan of Action. The latter placed most of the blame for the dire
economic  performance  in SSA oi. factors which are beyond the control of economic  policy makers in
the region - namely, ever-declining  real commodity  prices and declining  overall terms-of-trade,
world recession, rising international  interest rates and debt burden, and extended periods of drought.
The above two sharply contrasting  views of the causes of the crisis in SSA have led to two
very different development  strategies for the region.  Oyejide (1990)  has summarized  these two
diametrically  opposite  policy prescriptions  as follows:
The African view enshrined  in the Lagos Plan of Action recommended  the promotion
of regional co-operation  and integration  based on an essentially  inward-looking
strategy, which at the same time sought to put some distance between the alleged
fragile, rigid and undiversified  African  economies  and an 'unreliable and hostile'
external environment. The World Bank's policy recommendation,  on the other hand,
has pointed in the opposite direction  by urging the adoption  of an outward-oriented
strategy  that would become operational  through adjustment  and appropriate  domestic
policy reforms, (p. 2).
A careful review of the empirical evidence  (appendix  A) suggests  the following  broadly  stated
synthesized  position: There is no doubt that the sources of the crisis in SSA are multi-dimensional.
However, most recent empirical studies point to the importance  of inappropriate  domestic policies
behind the economic  malaise  in SSA.  Hence, although  African  governments  cannot do much about
the external  sector and climatic shocks, they can certainly  take measures  to enhance  the economic
policy environment  in their respective  countries  by undertaking  appropriate  policy reforms.  On the
other hand the peculiar structural characteristics  of the African  economies  may require altering  the
standard  Bank reform programs in the fundamental  ways.  Even though macroeconomic  stability,
microeconomic  efficiency  and outward-orientedness  should remain the main underpinnings  of the
program; some critics argue that there should be as well a balanced  emphasis  on institutional
structural reforms, especially  at earlier stages of the programs. Another related issue is that a- 16 -
successful  reform and development  strategy for Africa must give due consideration  to the critical need
of reforming  African countries  to adequate  and sustainable  external  assistance  and to relatively longer
time, before they could produce tangible  results. 9
4.2  Bank Adjustment Lending Programs in Sub-Saharan Africa
More and more, the leading regional institutions  (such as the Economic  Commission  for
Africa and the African  Development  Bank) and governments  in SSA are recognizing  the important
role of inappropriate  domestic  policies which led to the economic  crisis.  For instance, the joint 1985
ADB/ECA  Economic  Report on Africa pointed to the adverse  effects of inappropriate  policies on
agricultural and industrial  performance  in SSA.  Once it is recognized  that inappropriate  policies have
been responsible  for the economic  crisis in SSA in important  ways, it becomes clear that domestic
policy reforms (supported  by complementary  institutional  reforms) offe- a plausible avenue to reverse
the declining  trends in economic  performance  in the region. Since the focus of this study is on the
effectiveness  of World Bank adjustment  programs in SSA, the rest of this section (and appendix  B
below) will concentrate  on these programs.' 0
Countries in SSA have been slower than low-income  countries  in other regions to start the
adjustment  process.  However, in the past five years, many countries  in SSA have made significant
progress in adopting, implementing  and intensifying  policy reforms.  Most of these countries  either
have started or have intensified  adjustment  efforts since 1986. Hence, of the 34 countries in SSA
which had an adjustment  program in the period 1980-90,  23 had started in 1986.  Also, of the 114
new loans approved  by the World Bank to countries in SSA to support policy reforms in the period
1980-90, about 70 percent were made in the period 1986-90. Some countries such as Ghana, Kenya,
Madagascar,  Malawi, Mauritius  and Tanzania  have implemented  intensive  and bold policy reforms.
Signs of improvements  in countries which started an early program of intensive adjustment  (such as
Ghana, Mauritius  and Malawi)  have encouraged  others to embark on comprehensive  economic  policy
reform programs.
World Bank and IMF type structural adjustment  programs refer to the use of quick-disbursing
loans in support of major macroeconomic  and microeconomic  policy reforms.  The World Bank has
9 Specifically  structuml  adjustment  programs  in SSA  are claimed  to be underfunded,  led to cut in expenditure  required  for
enhanced  capacity  utilization  and capacity  growth,  placed too much  emphasis  on traditional  export  promotion  could only  lead to
decLining  TOT while  retarding  induftrialization  and not helping  export  diversification.  Finally, it is also claimed  that
adjustment  programs  have  had adverse  social  consequences. While  some  of these  and other  claims have  been refuted  or
marginalized  by recent  evidence  (e.g. RAL  n report),  the issues  regarding  underfunding,  debt reduction,  the import-induced
capacity  utilization  effect, and the possible  effects  of traditional  export  expansion;  merits  further studies.
'0 The rationale  for the stWategies  for African  development  laid out in the Lagos Plan  of Action  is given in detail in the 1989
United Nations  Economic  Commision  for Africa  roport African  Altemative  Framework  to Structural  AdLustment  PEoommmes
for Socio-Economic  Recovery  and Trmnsfomastion.- 17 -
supported  macroeconomic  stabilization  and broad-based  policy changes  through structural adjustment
lendings  (SALs) and sector-specific  reforms through sectoral adjustment  lendings  (SECALs). Most of
the initial adjustment  loans were in support of broad-based  macroeconomic  policy reforms.  However,
since the mid-1980s, SECALs  have been growing in importance. Given the importance  of agriculture
in SSA, about  half of all SECALs  have been geared towards that sector.  The World Bank is
continuously  rethinking  its strategy concerning  adjustment  programs. Policies aimed at reforming  the
key sectors and institutions  have risen in importance  in the late 1980s. Also, more and more attention
is being given to the social dimensions  of adjustment  programs. For instance the World Bank (1991a)
notes that "The Bank and other donors are increasing  supporting  reforms of social policies, data
collection to improve the design of social policy, special interventions  to mitigate short-term  burdens
of adjustment  on the poor, and the use of project and social sector loans to achievc  major social
objectives, (p. 8)."
Structural adjustment  programs consist of policies aimed both at stabilizing  the macroeconomy
and at reforming the structure of incentives  in various sectors of the economy  and generally
emphasize  outward-oriented  trade strategies. The stabilization  component  of the adjustment  programs
which works mainly on the demand side is aimed at controlling  inflation  and correcting  temporary
imbalances  in the balance of payments  via expenditure  reducing  policies.  However, structural (supply
side) policies which are aimed at improving  the efficiency  of resource  use and creating  more
appropriate  incentives,  emphasize  the following: liberalizing  the trade regime; deregulating  the
domestic  goods market; reforming the public sector; enhancing  agricultural  price incentives;  removing
obstacles  to saving and investment;  and strengthening  of institutions.
The following  groupings  of the policies involved  in adjustment  programs can be made:
demand-side  policies; supply-side  policies; and policies aimed at improving .iternational
competitiveness."
*  Demand-side  policies involve  the traditional  macroeconomic  policies (monetary, fiscal
and exchange rate) aimed at reducing  domestic aggregate  demand.
*  The aim of supply-side  policies is to enable the economy  raise production  for any
given level of resources. Two types of supply-side  policies exist. First, there are
policies designed  to improve  the efficiency  in the use of scarce resources such as
capital and labor by reducing  domestic  distortions  caused  by government  interventions
like price controls, taxes and subsidies, and trade restrictions. Second, there are
policies designed  to improve the capacity  of the economy  to raise long-run output
See Khan  and Knight  (1985), for instancm.- 18-
growth.  Such policies include  those designed  to raise incentives  for saving and
investment,  and those to increase  the efficiency  of capital and the inflow of foreign
savings.
*  Policies aimed at improving  international  competitiveness  are mainly geared toward
affecting  the country's real exchange  rate and export performance  by raising the prices
of tradables relative to those of non-tradables. Both demand and supply side policies
are used towards that end.
The purpose of these policy reforms is to induce a significant  overhaul in the economic
environment  of the countries concerned  in order to boost the structure of incentives  and raise the
profitability  of the tradables sector.  It is expected  that economic  agents will react favorably  to such
incentives  and improved economic  environment  by investing  in the tradables sector of the economy,
thus providing the connection  between adjustment  and growth.
In most countries undergoing  adjustment  programs, policy reforms are addressed in several
key areas of the economy: the macroeconomy;  the agricultural  sector; the trade sector; the financial
sector; and the public sector. The World Bank (199la) has identified  eight areas where intensive
reforms have taken place in SSA: (a) fiscal management;  (b) exchange rate; (c) external  trade; (d)
agricultural  price and marketing; (e) financial  sector; (f) civil service; (g) public enterprise; and (i)
domestic  trade.  There have been varying  degrees of success  with policy reforms in SSA. The World
Bank (1988a) notes that substantial  progress has been made in (a) exchange  rate flexibility  and export
incentives,  (b) progress in the replacement  of quantitative  restrictions  by tariffs, an4 (c) agricultural
policy reforms.  However, success with import liberalization  and institutional  ro.nims has been much
slower.
Appendix  B to this paper gives further details on the extent of and rationale for policy
reforms both at the macroeconomy-wide  and the sectoral levels and for the support of institutional
reforms.- 19 -
S.  EFFECTIVENESS  OF ADJUSTMENT  PROGRAMS
5.1  Analysis of Initial Conditions,  Exogenous  Shocks and Policy Stance
The aim of this sub-section  is to evaluate  the initial conditions  in terms of policy stance and
economic  performance  for SSA and LICs during the periods: 1970-80, 1981-84  and 1985-89. The
latter period preceded  the onset of the economic  crisis in the first half of the 1980s. The period
1981-84  was marked by the decision  to participate  in Bank-assisted  structural adjustment  programs.
Each of the two groups of countries  (SSA and LICs) is divided into three categories: early intensive
adjustment  lending (EIAL) countries  that received  two or more SALs or three or more adjustment
loans (SALs or SECALs), before 1986; other adjustment  lending (OAL)  countries that started a
program after 1985 or received fewer than two SALs or fewer than three adjustment  loans before
1986; and no adjustment  lending (NAL), countries  that did not participate  in adjustment  in the period
1980-88  (NAL).
The main objective  of the evaluation  is to examine  whether there exists any systematic
association  between the initial conditions  in the 1970s  and the response of the economies  of SSA to
the massive adverse exogenous  shocks of the late 1970s  and early 1980s  (and hence between
performance  in 1981-84  and the decision  to participate  in Bank-assisted  economic  reform on the part
of the countries with the most unsustainable  initial conditions).
5.1.1  Initial Conditions: 1970-80
Table 5.1 provides a summary  of economic  conditions  in the 1970s  for the three groups of
comparators. 12 Starting  with the comparisons  within SSA, it is clear that the EIAL and OAL
countries  have pursued more expansive  macroeconomic  policies  than their NAL counterparts,  with
fiscal deficit to GDP ratio averaging 6.6, 3.6 and 2.4 percent respectively. Not surprisingly  the rate
of domestic  inflation averaged 14.9 and 14.8 percent respectively  for the first two groups, compared
to 10.9 percent for NAL countries. Also the EAIL and OAL countries  have been less conservative
compared to the NAL countries in terms of external  debt policies. The external debt to GDP ratio
averaged 33.1 and 26.3 percent respectively  for EAIL and OAL countries, compared  to 23.5 percent
for NAL countries. The debt service to export ratios on the other hand, averaged 7.7 and 5.5
percent, respectively  for the EAIL and OAL countries  and only 3.8 percent for the NAL countries.
Over the period 1970-80,  the domestic absorption  to GDP ratio (the negative  of the resource
balance ratio) for the three groups averaged 10.6, 13.6 and 10.1 percent respectively. Also, in the
12The  analysis  win be confined  to within  SSA  comparisons;  but quantitativel;,  all  the main  conclusions  cany over to the ca
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1970s  the two "would  be" adjusting  groups of countries  did not adopt more export-oriented  policies
or achieve  better export performance  compared to the NAL countries. While the real exchange  rate
index for the three groups ranged  between 93 and 98, export  to GDP ratio averaged 30.2 percent for
the EIAL and NAL countries  compared to only 21.0 percent for OAL countries. These comparisons
provide a case against  the relatively  more expansive  external  debt policies adopted  by the EIAL and
OAL countries in the period prior to reform.
Perhaps the most significant  aspect of the initial conditions  that set NAL countries  apart from
the other two groups is the record on growth and the implied  productivity  of investment. While the
NAL countries  managed to achieve  an annual average rate of growth of 6.0 percent over the 1970s,
the EIAL and OAL countries grew by only 3.7 and 3.2 percent respectively  in the same period.
There was no significant  difference  among  the three groups, however, in terms of aggregate
investment  expenditure  (with investment  to GDP ratio averaging  24.7, 20.5 and 21.1 percent
respectively  for the EAIL, OAL and NAL countries). Clearly the EIAL and OAL countries  were
substantially  outperformed  by NAL countries  in terms of real economic  growth despite  the
comparable  investment  ratios across the three groups.  There was a significant  difference  in the
aggregate  domestic saving to GDP ratios among the three groups of countries  with average values of
16.1, 12.8 and 6.4 percent respectively  for the EAIL, NAL and OAL countries.
The above analysis  suggests  that EIAL and OAL countries  may have suffered from rather low
investment  productivity  prior to reform compared  to the NiL  countries. It has been argued that the
rather sluggish  growth in SSA despite adequate  investment,  may be attributed  to low level of capacity
utilization  as opposed  to capacity  growth, driven by investment. Given the imperfect substitutability
between imported intermediate  goods and domestically  produced  goods in most of the economies  of
SSA, the level of imports  may be a reasonable  measure for capacity  utilization  in SSA (Ndulu 1990).
According  to Table 5.2 this justification  may be a valid explanation  for the case of the OAL countries
with an average import to GDP ratio of 34.7 percent during the 1970s, but it cannot explain the low
growth performance  in the EIAL countries  compared to their NAL counterparts  with an average
import ratio of 40.8 percent for the first group and about 40.3 percent for the second.
5.1.2  Exogenous  Shocks.  Policy Stance and Adoption of Adjustment: 1981-84
The above analysis indicates  that countries in SSA that undertook  Bank-assisted  adjustment
entered the 1980s  with relatively weaker economies. These countries  did not fare well compared  to
the NAL countries in terms of: (i) actual growth performance  as well as the potential for .Iture higher
growth; (ii) sustainability  of external  finance and external debt strategy; and (iii) the ability to control
excess aggregate  demand and achieve  internal  balance. In light of these findings, it is natural that the
massive exogenous  shocks  that dominated  the late 1970s  and the early 1980s  have had a much more- 21 -
devastating  impact on the economies  of the EIAL and OAL countries of SSA than those of the NAL
countries.
Table 5.3 shows the magnitudes  of the terms-of-trade,  foreign interest rate, and total external
shocks for three period comparisons: 1981-84  compared  to 1970-80, 1985-89  compared  to 1970-80,
and 1985-89  compared to 1981-84. In the first period comparison,  the EIAL and NAL countries
were subject to similar and much bigger negative  external  shocks compared  to the OAL countries.
The magnitude  of the aggregate  shock relative to GDP was -15.4  and -16.4 percent respectively  for
the EAIL and NAL countries, almost twice the total negative shock experienced  by the OAL
countries. Fo; all three groups, the collapse  of the terms-of-trade  for SSA has been the factor with
the most devastating  effect; it accounted  for 88 percent of total shock for the EIAL countries, and for
83 and 93 percents, respectively  for the OAL and NAL countries.
Economic  performance  for all of the three groups is provided in Table 5.4.  The ELJAL
countries  of SSA experienced  a dramatic decline in real GDP in 1981-84  when it grew at only 0.1
percent per year (compared  to an average of 3.7 percent for the period 1970-80). The OAL countries
maintained  their 1970-80  growth level of 3.2 percent per anium.  The rate of growth in the NAL
countries, on the other hand, declined  to 4.5 percent per year over the first half of the 1980s  - this
was lower than the previous period average but still high compared  to the other two groups.  In the
period 1981-84, both the EIAL and NAL countries  experienced  reductions  in their investment  ratios
by 26 and 14 percent respectively  and in their saving ratios by 39 and 17 percent.  The OAL
countries  of SSA, however, managed  to achieve  a slight increase in their average investment  ratio by
about 5 percent in the period 1981-84,  while their average saving ratios declined  by 8 percent.
Furthermore, the NAL countries  had a clear edge over the other two groups in the period
1981-84  in terms of domestic inflation  and export performance. The rate of domestic inflation
declined  for the NAL countries  from an annual average of 10.9 percent in the period 1970-80  to a
single digit average of 8.3 percent, while  their average export ratio increased from 30.2 percent to
32.9 percent.  The reverse happened  for the EIAL and OAL countries. Between  the periods 1970-80
and 1981-84, inflation  increased  from an annual average of 14.9 percent to 21.0 percent in the ELAL
countries  and from 14.8 percent tr "4.5 percent in the OAL countries. Also the average export to
GDP ratio declined  from 30.2 percent to 27.7 percent for the first group, and from 21.0 percent to
19.6 percent for the second.
Despite the similarity in terms of the external  shocks experienced  by ELAL  and NAL
countries  of SSA, economic  performance  in the last group was uniformally  superior compared to the
first.  Also despite witnessing  twice as much negative  external shocks compared  to OAL countries,
the NAL group has performed  better especially  in terms of domestic inflation  and exports. An
interesting  question  to consider  is whether  this happened in spite of important  changes  towards- 22 -
reform-oriented  policieson the part of EIAL and OAL countries  or whether the policy stance taken
by these countries in fact was not significantly  changed  from those of the 1970s.
Table 5.2 provides a summary  of the evolution of policy stance by the three groups of
countries  over the period 1970-89. The real exchange  rate of EIAL countries  of SSA appreciated
considerably  over the periods 1981-82  and 1983-84, where the real exchange  rate index increased
from 93.8 in 1970-80  to 120.3 in 1981-82  and 126.3 in 1983-84. The real exchange  rate of EIAL
countries was more appreciated  than that of NAL countries  where the real exchange  rate rose from
98.0 in 1970-80  to 106.7 and 117.2 in the two following  periods.  Given the much weaker initial
conditions  (in 1970-80)  for the EIAL countries, and the change in the fundamentals  as reflected  by the
sizable adverse  exogenous  shocks  that effected  these countries, it is clear that these EIAL countries
might have experienced  considerable  overvaluation  over the 1981-84  period.  Therefore, the observed
decline in exports from EIAL countries  over this period is consistent  with the appreciated  real
exchange  rates of these countries  over the period.  This analysis  also applies  to the decline of exports
from OAL countries even though the appreciation  was much smaller for this group, where the real
exchange  rate appreciated  by only 16 percent between 1970-80  and 1983-84.
In terms of fiscal policy, 1981-82  has been a period of continued  expansive  macroeconomic
policy on the part of all groups. Compared  to 1970-80,  the fiscal deficit  to GDP ratio increased  by
62, 89 and more than 200 percent respectively  in the EAIL, OAL and NAL countries. The fiscal
expansion  continued  over the following  period for OAL and NAL; between 1981-82  and 1983-84,  the
deficit ratio increased  by 10 and 48 percent respectively  for OAL and NAL.  The ELAL  countries, on
the other hand, managed to reduce their average fiscal deficit by 32 percent between  the two periods.
This was still, however, higher than the 6.6 percent deficit ratio registered for 1970-80. Even though
the fiscal deficit in all of the three groups of countries  might not have been sufficiently  brought under
coxtrol over 1981-84,  it appears that aggregate  demand  has been steadily retrenching  in EIAL and
NAL.  The domestic absorption  ratio fer EIAL countries decreased  from 10.6 percent in 1970-80  to
8.4 percent in 1981-82,  and to 4.5 percent in 1983-84. For the NAL countries  this ratio decreased
from 10.1 percent in 1970-80  to 8.6 percent in 1981-82,  and it turned to -0.2 percent in 1983-84.
The aggregate  demand  policy in the OAL countries,  however, has been quite expansive  over 1981-84
when the absorption  ratio deteriorated  from 13.6 percent in 1970-80  to an average of 18.0 percent in
1981-84. The reduction  of aggregate  demand in both of EIAL and NAL countries  has been partly
achieved  by import compression. Between 1970-80  and 1981-84,  the import ratio declined by 16
percent and 8 percent for the EAIL and NAL countries, respectively. The average import ratio Mn  the
OAL countries, on the other hand, increased  by 8 percent over the two periods, reflecting  the
continued expansion  in aggregate  demand in these countries.- 23 -
The following  broad conclusions  for SSA can be drawn from the above  evaluations:
(i)  The adverse exogenous  shocks  that affected  most LICs especially  those of SSA, over
the first half of the 1980s,  have certainly  been the trigger that pushed the ETAL  and
OAL countries  to the brink of economic  crisis and to the subsequ-ent  decision  to adopt
Bank-assisted  reform programs.
(ii)  The exogenous  shocks  by themselves,  however, do not explain either the crisis or the
decision ta adopt programs.  The interaction  between  the external shocks and the
in.ti-  conditions  that prevailed in the 1970s  is key to understanding  why these
countries embraced  reform.
(iii)  Except for an effort by the EIAL countries  at controlling  fiscal expansion,  other
groups had large fiscal deficits during the first stage of adjustment. After 1983,
however, when external finance became  increasingly  difficult", both the EIAL and
NAL countries  made considerable  efforts at reducing  aggregate  demand, mainly
through in-nort  compression.
(iv)  Over the period 1981-84,  the adjusting  (EIAL and OAL) countries  could not
distinguish  themselves  from the NAL countries  in terms of real depreciation. While
the EIAL and OAL countries suffered from a dramatic rise in inflation, the NAL
countries managed  to reduce their average inflation  rates to the single digit.
5.1.3  External Shocks  and Policy  Stance: 1985-89
Compared  to the period 1970-80,  all three groups of countries received  negative  shocks in the
period 1985-89,  although  with a lesser extent than the shock of the early 1980s  for EIAL and NAL
countries. This implies that the external  conditions  were more conducive  to improved economic
performance  over the period 1985-89  in the EAIL and NAL countries. Between  the periods 1981-84
and 1985-89,  the terms-of-trade  improved  by 1.7 and 6.7 percentage  points of GDP in the EIAL and
NAL countries, respectively. These terms-of-trade  improvements  were more than enough to account
for the still rising cost of external borrowing  which increased  by 0.6 and 0.7 percentage  points of
GDP, respectively,  for these two groups. The terms-of-trade  for the OAL countries, however,
worsened by 2.5 percentage  points of GDP to add to a 0.8 percentage  point foreign interest cost for
these countries.
In the third period the EIAL countries  of SSA clearly  distinguished  themselves  from the
others in the region in terms of fiscal policy and real depreciation. In comparison  to the period 1981-
13 See Table 5.2.- 24 -
84, the average annual real exchange  rate in 1985-89  was depreciated  by 30 percent in EIAL
countries, compared to only 13 percent for the OAL countries and a 5 percent appreciation  for NAL
countries. The latter also cut down on their average fiscal deficit  to GDP ratio in 1984-89  by 3.2
percent relative to 1981-84  and by 0.8 percent relative to 1970-80  (compared  to an increase of 1.8
and 5.4 percentage  points for the OAL countries  for the same period comparisons). The average
fiscal deficit to GDP ratio for the NAL countries  was still almost  6 percent higher in 1984-89
compared to 1970-80, even though it came down by about 1.2 percent between 1981-84  and 1985-89.
5.2  Effectiveness  of and Decision to Participate in Adjustment Programs
5.2.1  Before-and-After  Approach
The before-and-after  approach  gives a picture of what has actually  happened after the
implementation  of programs; it does not, however, answer the question  regarding  the effectiveness  of
programs. The main drawback  of this approach  is that it implicitly  makes the implausible  assumption
of "other  things equal".  This is not a trivial point since it is not clear whether  the change in
performance  after implementation  of the programs can be attzibuted  to the programs or to changes in
factors unrelated  to programs (such as terms- of-trade  or interest rate shocks).
Table 5.4 shows that real GDP growth rose significantly  for EIAL countries in SSA from an
annual average of 0.1 percent in 1981-84  to 3.7 percent in 1985-89. The OAL countries  maintained
their pre-program  perfornance, where real GDP growth declined  by 0.1 percent in 1984-89  compared
to 1981-84  and by 0.2 percent compared  to 1970-80. The NAL countries, however, experienced
continued  economic  decline where average annual real GDP growth fell from a high of 6 percent in
1970-80  to 4.5 percent in the 1981-84  and to 2.3 percent in 1985-89.
The investment  ratio declined  steadily for all groups of countrie. where between 1970-80  and
1985-89  it fell by 32, 9 and 18 percent respectively  for the EAIL, OAL and NAL countries. The
saving ratio also declined  by 32 and 17 percent respectively  for the EIAL and OAL between  the
1970-80  and 1985-89. The same variable increased  in the NAL countries  by 17 percent between
1970-80  and 1985-89. Compared  to 1981-84,  the EIAL countries managed  to improve  their average
export to GDP ratio by almost 2 percent to reach close to the 1970-80  average ratio of 30.2 percent.
For the OAL and NAL countries, however, the deterioration  in export performance  could  not be
arrested; between the 1981-84  and 1985-89,  their average export ratio declined  by 1.1 and 2.6 percent
respectively.
Finally, with respect to domestic inflation, the NAL countries  out-performed  the EIAL and
OAL countries in both 1981-84  and 1985-89. The EIAL countries  were able to reduce their average- 25 -
inflation  in the 1985-89  a level comparable  to that in 1970-80.  However, the average inflation  rate
did not improve in the OAL countries  between  the 1981-84  and 1985-89.
The following  broad conclusions  can be made from the above analysis:
(i)  In the early phase of the reform program (1981-84)  which was dominated  by
stabilization,  growth was not restored for the EIAL and OAL countries of SSA.
However, growth did improve in 1985-89  in the EIAL countries  after enough  time
elapsed and after the reforming economies  adjusted  to the costs of the initial
stabilization  phase.
(ii)  The EIAL countries improved  their export performance  while export  to GDP ratio
from OAL and NAL countries  continued  to decline. It appears that the considerable
real depreciation  achieved  in the EIAL countries  may explain their relatively superior
export performance  in 1985-89  compared  to that of NAL countries, since both of the
two groups of countries  experienced  positive exogenous  shocks of about the same
magnitudes.
(iii)  The steady decline in investment  to GDP ratio in all country groups may be explained
by the less-than-proportionate  rise in private investment,  as public investment  declined
as part of the cut down in public expenditure  necessitated  by reduced external finance
or by program conditionality. The failure of private investment  to be forthcoming  can
be attributed  to at least two factors. First, public investment  in SSA may actually
have crowded in rather than crowded  out private investment. Second, there may have
been credibility  problems  due to doubts on the part of the private sector about  the
adequacy and sustainability  of reforms (in t'he  EIAL and OAL countries)  or the
prevailing  policies (in the NAL countries).
(iv)  The average increase in the import ratios of ELAL  countries in 1985-89  (it declined
for the other two groups) is consistent  with a relatively  less binding  external constraint
for EIAL as reflected  by the resource  balance indicators.
(v)  The improved  growth performance  in EIAL countries  despite the decline in aggregate
investment  can be explained  by the enhanced  capacity  utilization (via increased
imports)  and investmnent  efficiency  achieved  by these countries. The reduction in the
investment  ratio for these countries could  have had a more significant  effect in terms
of allowing for higher private consumption,  which should contribute  to enhancing  the
chances for the sustainability  of the reforms.-26 -
(vi)  Even though the analysis  supports  the concern regarding the rising inflation in the
adjusting  countries  of SSA (Chhibber 1991), it nevertheless  shows  that countries  that
undertook  deep reforms and stayed  with it (the EIAL countries)  were able to reduce
their inflation  to the pre-shock  levels." 4
(vii)  Finally, the indicators  of political stability  and political pluralism of Table 5.5 show
that the EIAL countries were more politically  stable on average compared to the OAL
countries  both in SSA and in LICs.  This finding supports  the view that reforms are
successful, when the programs are owned, actively  explained  and campaigned  for by
governments  that are politically  stable (e.g. Corbo and Fisher 1991).
5.2.2  Modified-Control-Group  Approach
An econometric  assessment  of the effectiveness  of the reform program in improving  economic
performance  in the adjusting  countries (especially  in the EIAL group), is the ultimate objective  of this
paper.  Tme  before-and-after  approach  is not suitable, however, for addressing  the question  of whether
the Bank-assisted  reform programs  have had significant  effect on economic  performance.
To address this question  adequately, estimations  need to be done for the marginal (additional)
contribution  of programs for given initial conditions  and exogenous  shocks. This requires a
methodology  that allows for endogenizing  the decision  to participate  in adjustment  programs.  But the
validity  of the maintained identification  conditions  regarding  participation  decisions  must be tested as
well.  An appropriate  methodology  to address the above concerns is contained  in Appendix  D.  The
study by Elbadawi (1991c) contains  rigorous specification  tests for conventional  endogeneity  (as
suggested  by equation (6) of Appendix  D) as well as test of assumptions  (8A) and (8B) regarding the
participation  decisions  (see Appendix  D for details). Based on these specification  tests, variants  of
equation (6) were estimated. The results of the estimation  for the performance  equations  are reported
in Tables 5.8, B.1 and B.2, while Tables 5.6 and 5.7 contain the probit estimation  results for LIC and
SSA respectively.
The modified-ontrol-group methodology  allows estimation  of the marginal  contribution  of
adjustment  programs in adjusting  countries while: (i) explicitly  taking account of the potential
endogeneity  of the decision to participate  in an adjustment  program, since the same non-program
factors that influence  performance  in the pre-program  period are likely to influence  the participation
decision, (ii) controlling  for other factors unrelated  to programs that also affect performance;  and (iii)
14 Th. fact  tht OAL cwntries  of SSA recived a large negative  exernal  shock  in the third  period conpared  to a positive  shock
for the EIAL  group, may  account  for this difference.- 27 -
adjusting for the counterfactual  policy stance that would have prevailed in the absence  of the
program.ls
The modified-control-group  model is estimated  to identify  the marginal  effect of reform
programs on economic  performance  in: (a) the EIAL countries  of SSA relative to the OAL and NAL
countries  of the region; and (b) the EIAL LICs relative OAL and the NAL LICs. 16 In terms of time
two possible periods can be compared: 1985-89  with 1970-80; and 1985-89  with 1981-84. The latter
is used in this study.
5.2.2.1  Determinants  of the Decision  to Participate in
Adjustment
Starting with the analysis of the program participation  status function  (equation  (8B')), Tables
5.6 and 5.7 provide the corresponding  maximum  likelihood  probit estimates  for LICs and SSA,
respectively. The tables also present the pseudo-R 2, defined by McFadden (1974) as a measure of the
goodness  of fit of the ML probit estimation. The decision  period is 1981-84  which witnessed  the first
five years of intensive  policy dialogue  between the World Bank and member countries regarding
Bank-supported  reform programs, and subsequent  adoption  of reform by these countries.
The following  variables are assumed  to be important  determinants  of a country's decision  to
participate  in an adjustment  program in the period 1981-84:  the change in the magnitude  of the
external shock between 1970-80  (period  one) and 1981-84  (period  two) (EXT21);  the index of
political pluralism in period two (POL2); the change in the ratio of total debt to GDP between  periods
one and two (DEBT21);  the level of inflation  in period two (INFL2); the export to GDP ratio in
period two (X2); the GDP growth rate in period two (GDP2); the change in the investment  to GDP
ratio between period one and two (GDI2  1); the change  in fiscal deficit to GDP ratio between  period
one and two (DEF2  1); the real effective  exchange  rate in period 2 (REER2);  and dummy  variables
for Asian and Latin American countries.
The full model was estimated  for the LICs and only a small subset of the above variables
were us6t for the model for SSA (given  the relatively  smaller riumber  of observations  available  for
this group).  In both models, all the coefficients  have the appropriate  signs and a large number  of
them are statistically  significant.  For the case of LICs the factors with the most significant  effect on
the decision  to undertake reforms are:  a higher foreign  debt and inflation, and lower investment  ratio
'5 Admittedly,  thero is no clearcut way to implemet  this counterfactal.  Hero, the OAL and NAL countries  ae used  for this
pulpose.
16 The ELUL  group of counies  for the  LICs is almost identical  to the  EIAL  countries  from SSA only since it includes only
Bolivia and  Pakistan as non-SSA  LICs.- 28 -
in period two compared  to period one, and a stable political environment  in period two.  The
corresponding  factors for the SSA case are:  lower investment  ratios and higher debt ratios in period
two compared  to period one, real GDP growth in period two, and political stability  in period two.
Also, the estimated  participation  indicators  in both models, successfully  predicted  the actual country
status.
5.2.2.2  Marginal Effectiveness  of Adjustment  Programs
In the second stage of equation the fitted value of the dependent  variable from the
maximum-likelihood  probit equation  (  37 ) was used as an instrument for di in target equation (6')-
except for the case of real GDP growth in LICs where d; rather than  a 1 was used (as suggested  by
the specification  tests of Elbadawi 1991c). Because  panel data are being used, the 'White
heteroskedasticity-robust  standard errors were calculated  in this estimation.
The results of the estimation  of equation  (6') are reported in Tables B. 1 and B.2 of Appendix  D
for LICs and SSA.  Table 5.8 presents the estimated  marginal effects  of the program for both groups.
In addition to the variables described above as potential candidates  for the estimation  of equation (6'),
an internal shock variable (reflecting  the impact of natural conditions  on domestic food production)  is
used (see Appendix C for details). Moreover, because  of our small sample size, statistically
insignificant  effects in the model for SSA were eliminated  from the final regression equation.
After controlling  for external  and internal shocks, the prevailing  political atmosphere,  and the
initial conditions  and policy stance followed  in the pre-program  period by each country, adjustment
programs do not seem to have had a statistically  significant  marginal  effect on the growth of the EIAL
countries  of SSA compared with the rest of SSA. However, there is some evidence  (at the 9 percent
significance  level) that it improved  real growth by 1 percent in EIAL LICs relative to non-program
LICs.
The estimates  of Table 5.8 regarding  the saving to GDP ratio show a marginally  significant
and negative  marginal program effect for SSA, where adjustment  programs were estimated  to have
reduced the saving to GDP ratio by 8.3 percent.  However, no significant  marginal  program effect
was found for the LICs.
Adjustment  programs appear to have contributed  to a statistically  significant  drop in the
investment  to GDP ratio in  the EIAL countries  of SSA relative to either other SSA countries  or to
the non-program  LICs.  The marginal  decline  was estimated  to be 8.4 and 5.3 percent respectively  for
SSA and LICs.  The combination  of these results on investment  and the estimated  nonsignificant- 29 -
marginal effect of adjustment  on economic  growth (at least for SSA) imply that the perceived increase
in the efficiency  of investment  supposed  to have been generated  by the programs was not sufficient  to
counterbalance  the ensuing  decline in investment  and hence to restore economic  growth.  Two further
implications  of these two findings are that (i) more attention  should be given to private sector
perception  about the credibility  of reforms, and hence to its likely response  to policies designed  to
enhance private sector investment,  and (ii) if on the aggregate,  public sector investment  expenditure
has in fact crowded-in  rather than crowded-out  private investment  in SSA, adjustment  programs have
to allow for increased public investment  in physical and human capital, while continuing  to require
the liquidation  or curtailment  of low efficiency  public (and private) investment  programs." 7
The estimated  marginal  effect of the program on export  performance  is positive and highly
significant  for SSA, and the effect for the LICs while  positive is only marginally  significant  for that
group (12 percent significance  level).  After controlling  for other factors, adjustment  programs were
estimated  to have increased the export to GDP ratio of the EIAL countries  of SSA by 8 percent
compared to other SSA and by 2.6 percent compared  to non-adjusting  LICs.
The last performance  indicator  considered  is inflation. The results of Table 5.8 indicate  that
adjustment  programs did not significantly  affect inflation. Even though the estimated  marginal  effect
of adjustment  has a positive sign, it is highly insignificant  for the case of LICs and only marginally
significant  (at 22 percent significant  level) for the SSA comparison.
Finally, according  to the results in Tables B. 1 and B.2, most of the factors reflecting initial
conditions,  policy stance, external  and internal shocks, and political conditions,  have had significant
effects that are consistent  with prior expectations. The factor that has been consistently  significant  is
the index of political stability, where for both the model for SSA and for LICs political instability  was
shown to reduce growth, investment,  saving and exports, and to increase inflation.
7 The evidence  on the response  of investment  to economnic  policy  is analyzed  in Serven  and Solimano  (1991).- 30 -
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Table  3.1  Growth  of  Rtal  SW  pr Capita  In  sMa:  1960-69.
1960-a9  1960-70  1970-80  1980-86  1986-89
Nish  Growth  Countries
Botswana*  7.5  2.1  9.9  6.3  6.5
Lesotho  5.5  5.5  9.0  -0.1  -0.1
Burundi  3.8  2.7  2.7  1.4  1.4
Oonco  3.0  1.0  2.2  3.9  -2.8
Swaziland*  3.0  6.2  1.8  0.6  2.5
Seychelles  2.9  1.2  4.9  -1.2  4.6
Mauritius*  2.6  -0.7  4.8  3.5  6.6
C meroon*  2.5  -0.1  3.9  4.3  -8.6
Mbdiua  frwoth  Countries
Kenya  2.3  2.5  2.9  -1.0  1.4
Gabon*  2.0  4.4  4.0  -0.9  -7.2
Cote  d'lvoire*  1.8  5.4  1.7  -3.1  -4.4
Malawi  1.5  2.5  2.4  0.0  0.3
Gamb  i  a  1.4  3.3  2.4  -3.0  6.9
Zimbabw*  1.4  1.2  0.2  -1.0  0.4
Burkina  Faso  1.2  0.9  1.3  1.9  0.0
somoros  1.1  4.0  -1.6  0.5  -3.1
Togo  1.0  5.4  1.6  -4.1  0.4
Low  or Ngative  growth  Countriew
Rwanda  0.9  -0.4  1.2  -0.9  -4.9
Tana-inia  0.6  3.2  0.2  -1.6  -0.3
Mauritania  0.4  4.5  -1.2  -2.0  -1.1
Nigeria  0.3  -1.2  2.2  -6.8  -1.8
Ethiopia  0.3  2.0  -0.1  -2.4  1.2
Samlia  0.1  -1.1  2.1  -2.3  -1.2
Benin  0.0  0.5  -0.2  -0.5  -3.3
Central  Afr.  Rep.  -0.2  0.4  0.1  -0.8  -2.5
Sudan  -0.3  -1.6  I.2  -1.8  -1.4
Saeneal*  -0.7  -0.3  .0.9  -0.1  -0.3
Zambia  -1.0  2.4  -1.5  -5.6  3.6
Shana  -1.3  -0.4  -2.1  -2.8  2.0
Chad  -1.3  -1.1  -2.9  5.4  3.3
iadaamscar  -1.4  0.5  -1.7  -3.8  -0.6
Zaire  -1.4  1.1  -3.3  -1.6  -2.0
Uganda  -2.0  1.6  -4.7  0.8  2.4
Niger  -2.1  -0.1  -1.3  -6.8  -2.8
others
Guinea-Bissau  ..  ..  -2.5  2.1  2.2
Malt  ..  ..  2.8  0.4  0.6
Sierra  Leone  ..  ..  -0.9  -0.8  -3.5
Sao  Tome/Prinoip  ..  ..  3.8  -5.7  -2.3
Shb-Seharan
Africa  0.4  0.5  0.9  -1.6  -1.7
South  Asia  1.6  1.4  1.2  2.7  3.6
All  Low  Inooo
Eoonomies  2.G  1.6  2.0  4.1  4.2
e  2  Middle  inoom  oountries.
Note:  All  ~owth  rates  wwe calculated  with  data  from  World  Bank,  World  S"nk  Economic  and  Social
Data  Bas (ESD)  using  the  Ordinary  Lest Squares  method.- 36  -
Table  3.2a  Real  Merchandise Export  Owth  for  SS  and Other  Developing
Regions.
1965-80  1980-89
Sub-Saharan  Africa  6.1  -0.6
South Asia  2.2  6.2
Latin  America and Caribbean  -1.0  3.6
All  Low Incane Economies  5.6  5.2
Source:  World Bank, World Develoomnnt Report.  1991.- 37 -
Table  3.2b Share  of  African  Total  Exports  in  World  ard  LDC  Exports.
1950  1960  1970  1980  1985  1988
Share  in
world  exports  3.3  2.9  2.5  2.5  1.7  1.0
Share  in
LDC  exports  10.1  13.4  13.8  12.0  7.1  4.9
Source:  UNCTAD,  Handbook  of International  Trade  and  Develooment  Statlsticj
(1989),  Table  1.1,  pp.  2-11.- 38 -
Table  3.2c  Growth  Rates of  Real Agricultural  OCmmodity  Exports  of  SSA  and
other  Developing  Regions: 1970-85 Average.
LOCs  SSA  America  South and
South East
Asia
All  Food Items  2.5  -2.5  2.4  5.3
Agricultural  Raw  Materials  0.7  -4.0  -0.7  -0.6
Source:  Akiyana  and  Larson  (1991),  p.  4.
Note:  The  export  series  were  deflated  by  World  Bank's  index  of  the  unit
value  of  manufactured  goods.- 39  -
Table  3.2d  World Shares of  Agricultural  Camnodity Exports  for  SSA  and  other
Developing  Regions:  1970-85.




All  Food Items
1970  32.4  7.6  15.6  6.6
1975  29.2  5.1  14.6  7.7
1985  31.5  3.8  15.6  9.6
Agricultural  Raw  Materials
1970  30.9  7.2  5.6  15.1
1975  25.2  5.4  4.6  12.8
1985  25.5  3.7  4.5  14.9
Source:  Akiyan and  Larson  (1991),  p.  5.- 40  -
Table  3.29 Shw.r  of  Major  African  Commodity  Exports  in  World  Exports.
Average  Average  Percentage  change
1970-79  1980-87  between  first  and
(%)  (%)  second  periods
Cocoa  74.2  65.2  -12.1
Blister  Copper  44.7  42.4  -5.1
Coffee  30.3  23.5  -22.1
Cotton  18.4  15.0  -18.5
Tea  17.5  19.6  12.0
Tobacco  9.6  12.3  28.1
suar  6.1  5.2  -14.8
Note:  The  shares  were  calculated  with  data  from  UNCTAD,  Comioditv  Yearbook
(various  issues).- 41  -
Table  3.3  Per  Capita  GNP and  External  Debt.
Country  GNP  Total  Debt  Debt  to
Per  Capita  Per  Capita  GNP Ratio
1988 Us $  1988 US $  1988 (%)
Benin  390  237  61
Botswana  1270  429  34
Burkina  Faso  230  101  44
Burundi  230  154  67
Cameroon  1010  377  33
Cape Verde  910  378  42
Central  African  Rep.  390  241  62
Chad  160  64  40
Comoros  440  450  102
Congo  930  2268  244
Cote  d'lvoire  740  1219  165
Ethiopia  120  65  54
Gabon  2970  2473  83
Gmbia  220  398  181
Ghana  400  221  55
Guinea-Bissau  160  450  281
Kenya  360  256  71
Lesotho  410  168  41
Liberia  450  680  151
Madagascar  180  320  178
Malawi  160  165  103
Mali  220  259  118
Mauritania  480  1089  227
Mauritius  1810  822  45
Niger  310  249  80
Nigeria  290  279  96
Rwanda  310  95  31
Sao  Tone and  Principe  280  839  300
Senegal  630  506  80
Seychelles  3800  2338  62
Sierra  Leone  240  185  77
Somalia  160  346  216
Sudan  340  499  147
Swaziland  790  360  46
Tanzania  150  191  127
Togo  370  360  97
Uganda  280  119  43
Zaire  170  252  148
Zarmbia  300  868  289
Zimrbabwe  660  287  44
SSA Total  365  334  91
Source:  World  Bank,  World  Debt Tables,  1989-90.- 42  -
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1965-70  1970-80  1980-86  1986-89
am  Total  1.4  2.1  0.9  1.9  1.7
South Asia  2.6  3.3  2.3  3.1  2.5
All  Low-Inoem
Eoomnmnes  1.7  2.7  1.1  2.5  2.1
Note:  All growth  ratoe  wer  salculated  with  F7O prodaotion  indioss  using  the  OrdinarY
Leat  Squares  mthod.- 43  -
Table  9.5  S  Soial  Indioators  in  SU  wnd other  Developing  Resions.
INFANT  IhrALITY RATE  (per  1000)
1965  1988
Sub-Saharan Africa  160  108
South  Asia  147  99
Latin  America  and Oaribbean  95  53
All  Developing  Economies  117  67
EDUOATION
Primory School  Enrollment  (percentage  of  age  group  enrolled)
1965  1987
Sub-Saharan  Africa  41  60
South  Asia  68  89
Latin  America  nd  Oaribbean  96  108
All  Developing  Economies  78  104
_  oonmrv  School  Enrollment  (pero ntag.  of  age  group  nrollod)
1965  1987
Sub-Saharan  Africa  4  17
South Asia  24  35
Latin  Am  rica  and  Caribbean  19  49
All Developing Economies  22  41
DAILY CALORIE SUPPLY (per capita)
1965  1986
Sub-Saharan Africa  2092  2096
South  Asia  2060  2228
Latin  Mrica  and Oaribbean  2457  2700
All Developing Economies  2116  2507
Souroe:  World Bank, World DeveloPment Report. 1990.- 44  -
Table  4.1  The  Population  Growth  Rates  in  SSA  and  other  Developing
Regions.
1965-80  1980-88
Sub-Saharan  Africa  2.3  3.2
South  Asia  2.4  2.3
Latin  Amrica and  Caribbean  2.5  2.2
All  Developing  Countries  2.3  2.0
Source: World  Bank,  World  Develoonent  Reowrt.  1990.- 45 -
Table  5.1:  Initial  Conditions  (Period  Average:  1970-1980)
Extenal DbSrv-  Rei  Fcl"  Re  ra nudaavo.  Rea  Oomeo Invoament  Dports
- debt  *  fecs  effotlv  dafkkte.  bal&*oeas rieot  GOP  aivinsas  as%  as  %
ot  GOP  --port  exoh.rat  ot  GDP  %*fGaP  infatk  growth  %*f GOP  of  GOP  of  GOP
EIAL
LIC  46.5  8.7  97.9  9.0  -5.9  13.5  4.0  16.9  22.8  29.1
SSA  33.1  7.7  93.8  6.6  -10.6  14.9  3.7  16.1  24.7  30.2
LIC  39.7  6.2  98.7  9.1  -10.2  13.7  3.2  8.1  18.3  18.0
SSA  26.3  5.5  93.1  3.6  -13.6  14.8  3.2  6.4  20.5  21.0
LIC  23.8  6.7  97.5  4.6  -7.8  10.5  4.1  9.7  17.5  19.0
SSA  23.5  3.8  98.0  2.4  -10.1  10.9  6.0  12.8  21.1  30.2- 46  -
4  Table  5.2:  Selected  Indicators  of  Policy  Stance
Real  offective  exchanoe  rato  Ratio  of  fiscal  dallcit  to  GDP
1970-80  1981-82  '1983-84  1985-88  1970-80  1981-82  1983-84  1985-89
EIAL
LIC  97.9  116.5  111.5  83.5  9.0  9.8  7.4  5.7
SSA  93.8  120.3  126.3  88.5  6.6  10.7  7.3  5.8
OAL
LIC  98.7  104.3  111.7  81.2  9.1  8.8  9.8  8.2
SSA  93.1  106.8  108.8  94.4  3.6  6.8  7.5  9.0
NAL
LIC  97.5  105.6  114.5  106.4  4.6  7.7  8.5  7.7
SSA  98.0  106.7  117.2  123.7  2.4  7.5  11.1  8.2
Ratio  ot  Imports  to  GDP  Ratio  of resource  balance  to  GDP
1970-80  1981-82  1983-84  1985-88  1970-80  198t-82  1983-84  1985-89-
EIAL
LIC  38.6  33.5  29.8  31.9  -5.9  -9.2  -4.1  -4.2
SSA  40.8  36.1  32.1  34.2  -10.6  -8.4  -4.5  -5.3
OAL
LIC  35.5  36.9  35.0  30.8  -10.2  -16.8  -15.2  -10.6
SSA  .34.7  38.4  37.0  30.9  -13.6  -18.7  -17.5  -11.8
NAL
LIC  32.9  34.8  29.5  27.4  -7.8  -16.1  -10.0  -4.2
SSA  40.3  40.5  33.7  32.7  -10.1  -8.6  0.2  -Z3- 47  -
Table  5.3:  External  Shocks
..a:-84  aompared  to 197  0-80  o19880compared  to  197C-80  1i8-89comparod to 1981-84
Terms  :Rel  Terms  Real  Terms  Real
... of::.  .Int.  Total  of  I  nt.  Total  of  I  nt.  Total
Trade  .... Rate  Shock  Trade  Rate  Shock  Trade  Rate  Shock
LIC  -10.6  -2.0  -12.6  -14.0  -3.2  -17.2  1.6  -0.5  1.1
SSA  -13.6  -1.8  -15.4  -13.4  -3.4  -16.8  1.7  -0.6  1.1
"AL
LIC  -8.6  -1.6  -10.2  -9.7  -3.6  -13.3  -1.7  -0.8  -2.5
SSA  -6.9  -1.4  -8.3  -9.8  -3.2  -13.0  -2.5  -0.8  -3.3
NAL
LIC  -18.7  -0.9  -19.6  -9.5  -2.0  -11.5  3.1  -0.6  2.5
SSA  -15.3  -1.1  -16.4  -8.5  -2.3  -10.8  6.7  -0.7  6.0
Notes: The  total  effect  of  external  shocks  as  %  of  GDP  is  computed  as  the  sum  of  real  interest  rate
effect  and  the  t-  ins  of  trade  effect.  The  interest  rate  effect  is  calculated  as  -(r-
rba )*(debt/GDP)b?gt  where  r  is  the  real  interest  rate  computed  as  (i-dp/p)/(l+dpip);  rbale
is  tne  average  real  interest  rate  of  the  base  period-  it  is  the  ratio  of  interest  payments
to  total  debt;  interest  payments  are  calculated  by  adding  public  interest  payment  to  private
interest  payments;  private  interest  payments  are  proxied  by  multiplying  private  debt  by  L
(IL  equals  three-month  annualized  LIBOR  plus  one  percent);  the  private  debt  is  estimated  by
subtracting  public  and  publicly  guaranteed  debt  from  total  debtS  dp/p  is  "world"  inflation
(proxied  by  the  percentage  chanoe  of  the  GNP  deflator  of  the  US),  and  (debt/GDP)beg  is  the
ratio  of  debt  to  GDP  of  the  year  preceding  the  beginning  of  the  end  period.  Debt  data
correspond  to  total  disbursed  guaranteed  and  nonguaranteed  debt.
The  effect  of terms  of trade  is  computed  as E(PX/PXb  se)-1)*(X/GDP)b  J-t(PM/PN  a  e)-
1)*(M/GDP)bA0],  where  PX  and  PM  are  the  average  export  andimport  price  inl7ces  deflatea  by
the  US  GNP  eflator,  respectively;  PXh  se  and  PMbase  are  the  average  price  indices  of  the
base  period;  X  and  N  are  exports  of  GNFaSInd  importiof  GNFS;  and  (X7GDP)beo  and  (H/GDP)ben
are  the  ratios  of  X  and  M  to  GOP  respectively  of  the  year  preceding  the  beginning  the  ena
period.  All  the  variables  are  denominated  in  current  US  dollars.- 48 -
Table  5.4: Country  Performance
-______  - s-JenttocD  Savina  to QDP
--  10704:.-10144-  1085-8.  107040-  11-84-  19846_  1970-*  108t-4  1986is  9
EIAL
LIC  4.0  0.1  3.7  22.8  18.4  10.2  18.0  11.8  10.2
SA  3.7  0.1  3.7  24.7  18.4  10.0  16.1  0.9  11.0
OAL
LIC  3.2  2.1  3.2  18.3  19.3  19.7  8.1  3.3  7.7
SSA  3.2  3.1  3.0  20.6  21.5  18.7  6.4  6.0  5.3
NAL
LIC  4.1  3.1  2.2  17.5  19.1  17.7  9.7  6.0  10.2
SSA  6.0  4.5  2.3  21.1  18.2  17.3  12.8  10.6  15.0
-Ex  ons to GDP  --  Ejo.t8hnEte  tnflatlon  :
1970-80 1081-84 1985-89  1970480  1081-84  1085-80  1970-80  1081-84  1085-89
LIC  29.1  27.3  28.2  3.4  3.2  ..  13.5  51.6  170.4
SMB  30.2  27.7  29.6  3.5  4.0  ..  14.9  21.0  15.0
OAL
LIC  18.0  19.4  19.2  0.8  2.3  ..  13.7  22.6  23.5
SSA  21.0  19.6  18.5  0.8  0.7  ..  14.8  24.5  24.6
NAL
UC  10.0  18.1  23.0  2.2  2.4  ..  10.5  7.7  6.7
SSA  30.2  32.9  30.3  0.9  0.7  ..  10.9  8.3  5.0
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Table  5.5:  Index  of  Political  Pluralism
1971-80  U1981-4  1985-86
EIAL
LIC  5.1  5.1  5.1
SSA  5.2  5.0  5.4
OAL
LIC  5.7  5.7  6.0
SSA  6.0  5.9  6.2
NAL
LIC  5.1  5.4  5.3
SSA  5.4  5.6  5.6
Notes:  The index is a simple average of two indeces on political
rights and civil liberties as reported in Gastil (1987)
The political rights index measures the extent of a fully
competitive electoral process.  The civil liberties index
measures the extent of freedom of expression of rational
political opinion.  In each scalo a rating of (1) is the
most free and (7) the least free.
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Table 5.6
Maximum  Likelihood  Probit  Estimates  of the  Status  Participation  Ecuation
Low-Income  Countries
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Stat  2-Tail Sig.
GDP2  -18.073  10.984  -1.645  0.109
GD121  -11.455  5.295  -2.164  0.037
POL2  -0.230  0.132  -1.736  0.091
DEBT21  3.024  1.617  1.869  0.070
EXT21  -2.111  1.719  -1.228  0.228
INFL2  2.000  1.125  1.777  0.084
X2  -2.456  2.213  -1.110  0.275
DEP21  8.235  7.604  1.083  0.286
LAC  -6.002  3.893  -1.541  0.132
ASIA  0.979  0.964  1.015  0.317
Note.  Log likelihood - -15.497;  pseudo R squared  =  0.48
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Table  5.7
Maximum  Likelihood  Probit  Estimates  of the  Status  Participation  Equation
Sub-Saharan  Africa
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Stat  2-Tail  Sig.
GDP2  -18.695  8.856  -2.111  0.043
GD121  -8.381  4.272  -1.962  0.059
DEBT21  2.338  1.186  1.971  0.058
REER2  0.012  0.008  1.473  0.151
POL2  -0.452  0.205  -2.202  0.035
Note:  Log likelihood  =  -12.496;  pseudo  R squared =  0.47
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Table  5.8
Modified  Control  Group  Estimates  of  Structural  Adjustment  Program
Comparing  period 3 (1985-89) to period  2 (1981-84)
:~~~~~~~~~~~  . . .,. ,. .. ;  SA-SdW -;  -
Change in GDP growth  0.010  -0.014
(1.733)  ***  (-0.830)
Change in ratio of exports to GDP  0.026  0.080
(1.570)  ****  (2.459)  *
Change in ratio of GDI to GDP  -0.053  -0.084
(-1.906) *  (-2.314) *
Change in ratio of ODS to GDP  -0.017  -0.083
(-0.691)  (-1.574)  *
Change in inflation  0.026  0.122
(0.383)  (1.244)  ***
t statistics in parentheses
*  Statistically  significat  at the 5% level
*  Statisticaly significant at the 6.5% level
*  Statistically  significant at the 9% level
*  StatisticaUy  significant at the 12% level
'***  Statistically  significant at the 22% levelFigure  $.1
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APPENDIX A:  CAUSES OF THE CRISIS IN SUB-SAHARAN  AFRICA
Following  up on the discussion  of section  4, we provide here a more detailed account of the
structuraiist  and the neoclassical  positions followed  by a detailed synthesis  based on recent empirical
evidence  including  the one obtained in this paper (section  5 above).
A.1  Neoclassical  View
Mkandawire  (1989) notes that "neoclassical  interpretation  is based on the theoretical  and
empirical corpus of work that essentially  derived from a set of theories on the efficacy of the market
system in resource allocation, p. 5."  The proponents  of the "inappropriate  domestic policies' behind
the economic  and agrarian crisis in Africa make use of solid neoclassical  economic  foundations  to
back their views. They believe in the existence  of well-behaved  production functions  with factor
substitution  possibilities and in the power of the markets and price signals to efficiently allocate  scarce
resources. They also believe in international  trade based on comparative  advantage  and outward-
oriented trade strategies. Hence, they argue that state interventionism,  by the use of non-price
mechanisms  to allocate scarce resources, and  .specially  through import substitution  has crippled long-
term growth  prospects in SSA. The vagaries  of weather come and go and commodity  price behavior
is more or less predictable. However, the adverse effects of chronic policy failures are long-lasting.
Economic  agents (including  peasants)  are rational  decision makers. They can weigh the relative
effects of the vagaries of weather, declining  commodity  prices and direct and indirect  taxation  of their
output and make their production  decisions  accordingly.
According  to the neoclassical  view, African  govermments  have pursued inappropriate  policies
which have seriously undermined  overall economic  performance  in general and agricultural  sector
performance  in particular. The latter has been directly biased against in the following  ways:
*  Agricultural  export commodities  have been taxed at high rates and farmers have
received lower prices for their products from inefficiently  run state marketing  boards.
*  The use of widespread  import  duties and quotas to corserve foreign exchange  have
forced farmers to pay higher prices for imported inputs or to purchase  higher cost
domestic substitutes  for agricultural  inpuJts.
*  The protection  of domestic  industrial sector and import-substitution  industries  through
import tariffs, quotas and licenses  have led to relatively high prices for the products of
these sectors and hence to a deterioration  of the internal terms-of-trade  for agriculture.
*  Typically, since independence,  governments  have given agriculture  a low priority in
their development  strategy  by allocating  inadequate  investment  funds for agricultural-68 -
research, construction  of roads, marketing  infrastructure  and the provision of schools
and health facilities in rural areas.
*  In many countries  a direct policy of cheap food (both imported and domestic)  for the
urban population  has encouraged  a preference  for imported food and discouraged
domestic food production.
In addition to these direct effects, agriculture  has been adversely  affected  by overvalued real
exchange  rates.  The real exchange  rate measures  the internal real terms-of-trade  between  traded and
non-traded  goods.  An overvaluation  of the real exchange  rate causes a diversion  of resources away
from the tradables sector to the non-tradables  sector of the economy. It is now widely accepted  that
the real exchange rate plays a critical role in the profitability  of both export-oriented  and import-
competing  agriculture (e.g., Elbadawi 1992a). The real exchange  rate is perhaps the most influential
relative price affecting  incentives  in the agricultural sector, given that the latter is highly open to
foreign trade.  The real exchange rate itself is affected  by macroeconomic,  nominal exchange  rate and
trade policies, policies affecting  capital  movements  (including  reserve changes, and foreign borrowing
and assistance),  and by economic  fundamentals  (such as the international  terms-of-trade).
Overexpansionary  monetary and flscal policies, excessive  inward-oriented  trade strategies and policies
which encourage excessive  net capital inflows  cause the real exchange  rate to appreciate.
Overexpansionary  monetary and fiscal policies cause the domestic credit to expand bey nnd  what is
necessary  to sustain nominal  devaluations,  foreign inflation  and real output growth.  The effect of
excess domestic credit is to induce inflation  and cause an appreciation  of the real exchange  rate.
Overvalued  real exchange rates bias against export and import-competing  agriculture  in a
number of important  ways:
o  Overvalued  real exchange  rates act as an implicit tax on tradables and hence
discourages  their production. Resources  shift to the production  of non-tradable  goods.
If the overvaluation  of the real exchange  rate is chronic as it has been in many
African economies, it becomes  very costly  to move resources back to the tradables
sector once policy actions are taken to correct the overvaluation.
*  Overvalued  real exchange  rates make food imports (such as wheat and rice) cheaper
than locally produced  staples (such as maize, millet, sorghum, roots, cassava, tuber
and pulses) and hence can shift consumers'  taste in favor of foreign foodstuff. The
demand for domestically  grown import-competing  substitutes  falls depressing  their
prices and hence lowering  domestic  production.- 69 -
*  Since or ervaluation  of the real exchange  rates discourages  the exports of agricultural
commodities,  export earnings  are diminished. This undermines  the ability of nations
to generate sufficient  foreign exchange  to import food, raw materials, capital goods,
and spare parts.  Hence, capacity in the tradables sector is adversely  affected. And
since export growth fosters economic  growth, poor export  performance, in turn, slows
growth.
*  Overvaluation  of the real exchange rate can adversely  affect agriculture  through its
effects on labor movements  (Oyejide 1986, pp. 43-44).  Overvaluation  makes  the non-
tradables sector more profitable  and hence induces  a movement  of labor away from
agriculture. A fall in labor supply in agriculture  puts upward pressure on labor costs
and raises overall production  cost to agriculture. A fall in internal  terms-of-trade  for
agriculture  and an increase in the costs of production  reduce profitability  in
agriculture.
Both direct and implicit taxation  of agriculture  have kept agricultural  production  at sub-optimal  levels
for extended  periods of time and have impaired  agricultural  growth.  Given the important  positive
interlinkages  between  the agricultural  sector and overall economic  performance  (Hwa 1983),
aggregate  economic  growth has in turn suffered. A competitive  real exchange  rate is necessary  for
the expansion  of agricultural  exports and the prevention  of balance  of payments  crises.
A.2  Structuralist View
The "structuralists"  have identified  a set of poor initial conditions  and a set of "structural
bottlenecks"  to explain the economic  malaise  facing almost all African states.  These  poor initial
conditions  which are said to have provided  SSA with an unfair departure at independence  relative to
other developing regions are the following:
*  At independence,  there was an extreme scarcity of adequately  trained local managers,
scientists  and other manpower  who understood  the resource  base available  for
development  and how to best use and manage that limited resource  base for
maximizing  welfare.
*  Many independent  states were politically  fragile due to the diversity  of cultural
background  of the people. In many instances, the existing  governments  spent much  of
their scarce resources fighting  for their political survival instead  of focusing on
development  strategies  to enhance welfare.- 70 -
*  At independence,  both the infrastructure  and the institutions  were very weak to
support development. In many instances, there were a few major roads or railway
networks for the entire country, often linking  the main areas of production and the
main harbor.  The infrastructure  to support educational,  agricultural research,
extension  programs and the legal systems  were weak and almost nonexistent. Also,
the colonizers did very little to establish  democratic  institutions.
*  The colonial  heritage left African states a legacy of heavy external dependence  on one
or two export crops for their economic  survival. These cash crops were subject to the
vagaries  of international  prices and unequal terms of exchange  with the industrialized
world.
In addition to these poor initial conditions,  a long list of structural bottlenecks  (which have
impaired  the ability  of independent  African countries  to grow rapidly)  has been identified as:
X  widespread  subsistence  farming and the predominance  of subsistence  activities;
*  shortage  of trained personnel  and scarcity of entrepreneurial  capabilities  to spearhead
and manage development;
*  weak institutions;
*  inappropriate  technology  and traditional production  techniques  marked by low levels
of productivity;
e  low levels of scientific  and technological  knowledge  and application;
e  development  with an urban bias;
*  small and fragmented  economies;
*  poor physical infrastructure  and transportation  networks  constraining  the integration  of
various regions of a country;
*  weaknesses  in political structures  of African countries  in which the interests of the
dominant  class are served at the expense  of the peasant masses;
*  excessive  dependence  on the foreign sector rendering  the African  economies  extremely
susceptible  to external  shocks;
*  colonial influence  marked by "too much" dependence  of the African manufacturing
sector on imported factor inputs such as capital, skilled manpower,  technology  as well
as spare parts and raw materials;
*  poor weather and prolonged  periods of drought; and
*  poor soil quality and a degraded environment.-71  -
These structural rigidities are blamed for the poor economic  performance  in SSA since they impose
constraints  on the ability  of farmers and entrepreneurs  to respond effectively  to price incentives.
A.3  A Synthesis
A.3.1  Political Factor
The arbitrary division  of the African  continent  by the European colonial  powers has not
helped many of the "resulting"  countries in their quest for nation-building. In many instances,
boundaries  were drawn in ad hoc ways without  regard to the ethnic origins of the people for whom
the nations were built.  As a consequence,  after independence  many ruling governments  (with lack of
popular legitimacy)  have had to rule by force to suppress the political and/or secessionist  ambitions  of
rival groups.  Also, political instability  triggered by political coups has been prevalent in Benin,
Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Uganda and Upper Volta. Ethnic violence  has continuously  erupted in
Benin, Burundi, Congo, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Somalia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zaire.  Furthermore, in
countries  such as Angola, Chad, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Sudan and Zaire, civil wars have severely
disrupted  economic  activities.  More than two-thirds  of Africa's hungry live in countries  involved in
heavy fighting (Ethiopia,  Sudan and Somalia)  and civil wars (Angola, Mozambique  and Liberia).
About half of the people who lack access  to enough food for an active and healthy life in SSA live in
countries (such as Ethiopia, Nigeria, Zaire, Uganda and Mozambique)  involved in conflicts (World
Bank 1988b).
Countries  which have been involved  in conflicts for protracted  periods of time (Angola,
Mozambique,  Ethiopia, Sudan, Zaire, Ghana, Uganda and Nigeria) have been among the worst
economic  performers in the region.  Conflicts  and political instability  have adverse effects on
economic  performance  for several reasons. The limited financial  and human resources are diverted to
military use and away from the production  of civilian  goods and services. The preoccupation  of
governments  in periods of instability  is more with strategies to stay in power than with economic
management  and the welfare of the average citizen. In addition, the lack of security for life and
property lowers productive investment  and affect production  adversely. Internal strife and civil wars
have driven peasants  away from their land, so that food production  has suffered.
In many countries in SSA the economic  and agrarian crisis and the accompanying  hunger and
famine have been caused more by bad economic  policies and chronic internal  civil wars and strife
(man-made  factors)  than by the vagaries of weather (natural factors). However, in the past year or
so, there appears to be a wave of change towards democracy  in SSA. Throughout  the region there is
pressure for governments  to be more accountable  of their actions. There is a growing demand for- 72 -
political pluralism and democratization. Many countries  have witnessed popular  protests demanding
political reform and accountability. In Benin, Cape Verde, Mali and Sao Tome/Principe  there has
been major steps towards democratization  of the political systems. In many other countries (such as
Ivory Coast, Congo, and Zaire) there are growing pressures  for economic  and pluralistic reforms and
democratization.  In a recent speech  by the outgoing  chairman  of the OAU, President  Museveni (of
Uganda)  noted that democracy  is an indispensable  prerequisite  for development  because it is the only
way to stamp out corruption  and promote economic  growth. The ECA also views steps towards
democratization  as an important  prerequisite  for the resumption  of economic  growth.
A.3.2  Lack of Export Diversification
Most countries  in SSA are heavily dependent  on one or two commodities  for their export
revenues and economic  livelihood. It is not uncommon  for a few commodities  to account for more
than 50 percent of merchandise  export revenues in certain countries  - coffee and cocoa in Cote
d'Ivoire; coffee in Burundi and Uganda; and tobacco and tea in Malawi. There are many reasons for
this lack of diversification  of African commodities. It has been argued that the agricultural and
import policies of the western industrialized  countries  are to be blamed  to some extent for the slow
growth and failure of countries  in SSA to successfully  diversify  their economies. Tariffs and non-
tariff barriers to trade by western industrialized  countries  have not helped African countries  to
diversify  their economies  into higher-value  added and semi-processed  agricultural  goods. Many non-
tariff barriers (such as quotas, voluntary export restraints, variable levies, minimum  price systems,
countervailing  taxes and duties)  affect in a progressive  way the entry price of processed commodities.
Such barriers discourage  local processing  of agricultural  goods into higher value-added  products.
It remains imperative  that governments  of industrial  countries  grant exporters  from LDCs
better access  to their markets. Commodity  exporters  would gain if industrial  countries reduced or
removed the protective  structure against  processed  commodities. There is a high desirability  for non-
tariff barriers to be dismantled. A change  in the access  of developing  country exports to industrial
country markets in the future will depend to a large extent on the success of the Uruguay Round of
trade talks.
However, the import policies of industrial  nations can be blamed only so much for the failure
of African countries  to diversify their export base.  Asian countries are faced with similar
protectionist  policies and have been able to diversify  to a large extent.  This is because the Asian
countries have taken full advantage  of the fast growing markets of developing  countries.- 73 -
All  Long-Term Constraints  on Gro%eLh
The World Bank (1986) has identified  rapidly growing  population, lack of human resources,
lack of health and education  services, lack of agricultural research, and rapid deforestation  as the
main long-term constraints  on economic  performance  in SSA.  One of the main factors  preventing  the
region's resumption  in per capita output  growth has been the fast growing population. Table 4.1
compares the population  growth rates in various developing  regions of the world.  Sub-Saharan  Africa
is the only developing  region where population  growth has accelerated  between  the periods 1965-80
and 1980-88  (from 2.7 percent to 3.2 percent). The World Bank (1989b) notes that:
Had the region's population  growth followed  South Asia's or Latin America's
declining  trend since the early 1970s,  per capita income  might have been 10 percent
higher than they actually are, assuming  the same growth in GDP, (p. 25).
Ever increasing  population  growth rates in SSA have imposed  severe constraints  on
development  prospects  of countries  in the region. High population  growth rates are taking their toll
on land quality in two important  ways:
*  First, the rapidly growing  population  has forced many African farmers  to shorten the
fallow periods - a period where the land is abandoned  and given time to build up the
lost nutrients - hence preventing  regeneration  of mature vegetation  and causing loss
of soil fertility and soil degradation  (World Resources  Institute 1990, p. 90).
*  Second, rapidly growing population  has contributed  to a rapid depletion  of fuelwood
supplies, deforestation  and desertification. As fuelwood  supplies become scarcer,
farmers have to burn animal  dung and crop residues instead of using them to enrich
and sustain the soil (World Resources  Institute 1990, p. 90).  Higher population
growth rates and retrenchments  in central government  budgets imply that more people
rely on the same (or declih.ig) number of hospitals,  doctors, schools and teachers.
A.3.4  Weather  Factor
Severe droughts have been detrimental  to agricultural  production  in many countries  in SSA.
For instance, severe cyclical droughts  and the great droughts of 1968-73  and 1982-83  in the Sahel
(Cape Verde, Chad, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Gambia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan
and Burkina  Faso), the Horn of Africa (Ethiopia,  Somalia and Djibouti) and other countries in the
Western and Southern  parts of Africa have taken their toll on food production. The result has been
large-scale migration, devastation  of living conditions,  starvation and widespread  deaths.- 74 -
However, drought cannot be entirely  blamed for massive  starvation ip the countries of SSA.
Botswana  faced a decade of drought in the 1980s  and no case of starvation was reported. Ihe
government  of Botswana  committed  itself to an active program  of assistance, assisted by the skills of
the private traders and retailers to protect the poor.  Kenya faced a severe drought in the mid-1980s
(as severe as the one that led to the great famine in Ethiopia.) The Kenyan government  recognized
the problem early and took bold steps to make the food deficits up with food grain imports.
A.3.5  Empirical Evidence
There is an acute dearth of empirical studies of the causes of the crisis in SSA.  This dearth is
even more pronounced  for the "structuralist"  view of the causes of the crisis.  Recently  there has been
some effort to empirically  identify the various causes of the crisis.  However, the crisis in SSA is so
deep and the data base for analysis  so limited  that more effort needs to be put into data gathering and
analysis. The precious  few studies which are available  point to the importance  of inappropriate
domestic  policies behind the sluggish  growth and economic  decline  in SSA. Recently, a few
empirical  studies on SSA have provided  evidence  on the roles of two sets of factors in explaining  the
poor economic  performance  in a number  of countries  in the region [Akiyama  and Larson (1991),
Elbadawi (1992a), Ghura and Grennes (1991), Jaegar (1991) and Svedberg (1991)].
The study by Akiyama  and Larson finds that the decline in export agriculture in SSA has been
caused  by overvalued real exchange  rates, low producer prices and technological  stagnation. For
instance, they find that "In general, real producer prices for coffee, cocoa, and cotton in SSA were
considerably  lower in the mid-1980s  compared with their level in the early 1970s  and compared with
those of the major competitors  outside  SSA, (p. 22)."  Figure 4.1 confirms  that the real effective
exchange rate of SSA was highly  overvalued in the mid-1970s  to the early 1980s. Also, Figure 4.2
indicates  that by-and-large  the export volume in SSA has been adversely affected  by overvaluations  of
the real exchange  rate.  For instance, between  the mid-1970s  to early 1980s  when the real exchange
rate was appreciating  in SSA, the general trend in the export volume was a negative  one.  The export
volume  reached Its lowest value in 1982  when the real exchange  rate was the most appreciated. After
1982 when the real effective  exchange  rate was depreciating  at a rapid rate, the rapid fall in export
volume was reserved with a slow recovery.
The study by Ghura and Grennes investigates  the impact  of real exchange  rate misalignment
on economic  growth, total and agricultural exports, total imports, saving and investment  in SSA.  The
real exchange rate, the relative price of tradables to non-tradables,  is viewed as an important  variable
in determining  economic  performance,  since it reflects the overall state of not only macroeconomic,
exchange rate and trade policies, but also of economic  fundamentals  such as the terms-of-trade  and
capital inflows. Indexes of the real exchange rate misalignment  are constructed  for 33 countries  in- 75 -
SSA based on a formal model of the determination  for the real exchange  rate.  The statistical analysis
provides evidence  that countries  which have pursued  judicious macroeconomic,  exchange  rate and
trade policies (thus maintaining  the actual real exchange  rate close to its equilibrium  level) have
experienced  better economic  performance.
The econometric  investigation  by Jaegar confirms  that the deterioration  of export agriculture
in SSA during the 1970s  and 1980s  was associated  with high levels of high direct and indirect
taxation (through government  controls  and overvalued  exchange  rates).  Krueger, Schiff and Valdes
(1988) have provided empirical evidence  that the negative  impact  of indirect  taxes (from overvalued
real exchange rates) on producer incentives  in agriculture  has been much stronger than the effect of
direct agricultural  taxes.  Elbadawi (1992a) confirms  this for the case of the Sudan (an African
country with a large agricultural economy)  and also provides econometric  evidence  confirming  the
predictions  of endogenous  growth models (e.g. Easterly 1990)  which allows policy distortions  to have
adverse effects on growth.  Furthermore,  the agricultural  growth model estimated  by Elbadawi  shows
highly significant  and harmful effects on agricultural  growth from real exchange  rate overvaluation
and shows only marginally  significant  effects from international  terms-of-trade  shocks.
Other studies have also pointed  to the importance  of inappropriate  domestic policies in
explaining  the poor economic  performance  in SSA.  For instance, a recent World Bank/UNDP study
finds that "Africa's crisis cannot be satisfactorily  explained  as the result of an adverse international
economic  climate, low commodity  prices, or dwindling  foreign assistance,  World Bank/UNDP 1989a,
p. 2."  Also, in a study on Tanzania, Sharpley  (1985) notes that "External  factors beyond the control
of the authorities  do not seem to have been the main reason for Tanzania's deteriorating  foreign
exchange  position, and falling prices on world markets  were not the main cause of Tanzania's
declining  real export earnings, p. 74."  In addition, in a recent report on Africa, the ADB notes that
"...the declining  export volumes  tin Africa] are to a large extent the outcome of trade policies that
have discriminated  against  the production  of tradable goods in general and exports in particular, p.
92."
Proponents  of the "external"  causes of the African crisis point to the ever-declining  terms-of-
trade for African commodities  as the main factor behind the poor economic  performance  in SSA. It
is claimed that declining  terms-of-trade  have wiped out potential  benefits from increased  production.
However, empirical investigation  by Svedberg  (1991) finds that this is not necessarily  the case.
Svedberg  investigates  the role of terms-of-trade  losses versus losses in export volume in explaining
the poor performance  of export earnings  in SSA for the period 1954-85. It is found that although
most countries in the region suffered a significant  decline in export revenues  in the period 1970-85,
the main cause of the decline was the falling export volume and not the declining  terms-of-trade. In
fact, in an earlier period, 1954-69,  although  the terms-of-trade  were not more favorable (than in the-76 -
latter period) in the region, export revenues  experienced  significant  growth due mainly to increases  in
export volumes. Svedberg  notes that real world market prices for most primary products (even for
countries  outside Africa) have declined  and fluctuated  considerably. Most countries in other parts of
the world (including  Asia) have successfully  diversified  their export base, whereas in most countries
in SSA, the export structure has remained  the same since independence.
The results from Svedberg's study confirm a similar finding of the Berg Report World Bank
(1981), that "The main cause of rising current account  deficits and shortages of foreign exchange  in
the 1970s  was not the terms-of-trade,  but the slow growth of exports; of the 29 countries for which
information  is available, 24 recorded a lower rate of export growth during the 1970s  than in the
previous decade, and 19 had negative  rates of export  growth, compared with only one during the
1960s  p.  19)."
Also, a comparison  of the terms-of-trade  for SSA with those for Asia and LDCs in general
does not indicate  a much different trend for the terms-of-trade  for SSA (Figure 4.3).  In fact,
although, the terms-of-trade  for SSA witnessed  an ever declining  trend since 1980, it was still about
34 percent higher in 1989  than its low level in 1967. Furthermore, although  other developing  regions
of the world experienced  a deterioration  in their terms-of-trade  in the 1980s,  their export volume still
grew at a rapid rate (Tables 3.2a and 3.2c, and Figure 3.4).
The overall terms-of-trade  picture conceals  some important  facts about individual  commodity
price performance. Countries in SSA typically  produce and export one or two major (agricultural  and
mineral)  commodities. World prices for most of these commodities  have fluctuated  widely  and in the
late 1980s  were at historically  depressed levels. Three commodities  of which Africa is a major
exporter (coffee, cocoa, and copper)  were severely depressed over the whole decade of the 1980s.
Their real prices were down in the 1980s  from their levels in the 1950s  by 40, 38 and 34 percents.
In 1989, coffee prices were at a 14-year  low.  The coffee price reached its lowest level in real terms
after the collapse of the coffee agreement  in 1989. Similarly,  after the failure of the international
cocoa organization  in 1989  on a new price support measure, real price fell to the level of 1945.
Also, another four commodities  (cotton, tea, sugar and tobacco) exported on a fairly large scale by
certain countries saw their prices plummet  in the 1980s. Their real prices were down in the 1980s
from their levels in the 1950s  by 53, 59, 33 and 25 percent.  The real price of sugar dropped by
almost  100 percent in the 1980s  from its level in the 1970s.
In addition to the study by Elbadawi discussed  above, only one study (by Wheeler 1984)
coull be identified  which investigates  the relative importance  of both the external factors and domestic
policies in explaining  growth in SSA.  In an investigation  of the influence  of internal  and external
shocks and policy failures on growth in SSA in the period 1970-80,  Wheeler used an eight variable
regression analysis  for a set of twenty-five  African countries. He classified  the variables into a set of-77  -
environmental  variables (terms-of-trade,  share of non-oil minerals in exports in 1979, export
diversification,  and violence)  and policy  variables (real effective exchange  rate, import allocation
regime for consumer  and capital goods separately,  and sustainability  of balance in trade accounts).
He found that  n  ...  the environmental  vatriables  seem to have had more impact  on growth as a group
than the policy variables ... (p. 1)."  However, Wheeler  . ade several qualifications  in interpreting  his
results.  For instance, data on (other)  policy variables relating to agriculture, industry and the various
factor markets were not available.- 78 -
APPENDIX B:  NEED AND RATIONALE FOR ADJUSTMENT LENDING
In most countries  undergoing  adjustment  programs, policy reforms are addressed in several
key areas of the economy: The World Bank (199la) has identified  eight areas where intensive
reforms have taken place in SSA:  (a) fiscal management;  (b) exchange  rate; (c) external  trade; (d)
agricultural  price and marketing; (e) financial  sector; (f) civil service; (g) public enterprise; and (i)
domestic  trade.  There have been varying degrees of success with policy reforms in SSA.  The World
Bank (1988a) notes that substantial  progress has been made in (a) exchange  rate flexibility and export
incentives, (b) progress in replacement  of quantitative  restrictions  by tariffs, and (c) agricultural
policy reforms.  However, success  with import liberalization  and institutional  reforms has been much
slower.
Following  the earlier disc'  ion of section 4, the remainder  of this appendix  describes  the
extent of and rationale  for policy reforms both at the macroeconomy-wide  and the sectoral levels and
for support of institutional  reforms.
B.1  Macroeconomic Reform
Stabilization  measures include  the traditional monetary,  fiscal and exchange  rate policies in an
attempt  to restore external (current account) and internal (unemployment)  balance, as well as to
control inflation  (Corbo and Fischer 1991, p. 5).  They are a prerequisite  for efficient  growth.  Fiscal
policy reforms have been a key component  of overall macroeconomic  reforms in SSA. Adjustment
programs in SSA have concentrated  heavily on the correction  of macroeconomic  imbalances. Hettige
et al. (1991) note that "The proportion  of policy measures  dealing with macroeconomic  issues in
Bank-supported  programs has been higher (26 percent) in Sub-Saharan  Africa than in other regions
(21 percent).  Contractionary  fiscal and monetary policies  have been implemented  in order to reduce
aggregate  demand and hence to bring expenditures  more in line with available  resources and restore
macroeconomic  stability. In general, adjustment  programs in SSA have placed much more emphasis
on correcting  macroeconomic  imbalances  than in other regions.
The presence of widespread  macroeconomic  instability  and the pressing need for
macroeconumic  policy reforms in n.3ny countries  of SSA in the early 1980s,  were evidenced  by the
presence  of widespread  parallel market activities. For instance, the share of the parallel market
activities  was about one third in Ghana in 1982  and above  60 percent in Sudan for most of the 1980s
(World  Bank, 1990a, p. 46).  Also, it was not uncommon  in countries  such as Ghana, Guinea,
Mozambique,  Tanzania  and Uganda for the black market rate of exchange  to be several times above
the official exchange  rate in the 1980s. Parallel markets are symptomatic  of fundamental
macroeconomic  mismanagement. For instance, a surge in the premium for foreign exchange may be
indicative  of unsustainable  fiscal deficits leading to higher inflation  rates in the country  concerned- 79 -
(than in the major trading partners) most often causing  the real exchange  rate to become overvalued.
The implicit taxation  imposed  on exportable  goods by an overvaluation  of the real exchange rate gives
rise to black market activities  in exports - for example,  underinvoicing  of exports and outright
smuggling. Such illegal activities  lead to reductions  in the government  export tax revenues.  Parallel
markets are usually  very efficient in that agents in that market adjust  their price expectations  very
rapidly with changes  in macroeconomic  and exchange  policies or in perceived  changes  in such
policies. Hence, such markets are usually a good guide for investors, farmers and other economic
agents for the credibility  of economic  policy reforms (Elbadawi 1991b).
The successful  stabilization  of the macroeconomy  is an important  step in the subsequent
success of the other phases of policy reform programs for two main reasons:
*  First, runaway public deficits which fuel inflation  have to be controlled, because
growing inflation  is an important  source of relative price distortions  at the sectoral
levels.
e  Second, the commitment  of a government  to stick to a firm stabilization  program
provides an important  signal to farmers, businessmen  and other economic  agents about
the credibility  of the announced  commitments  to reform the price structures at the
sectoral level.  Corbo and Fischer (1991) note that "Reforms  that start with low
credibility  about their sustainability  may temporarily  get cur-rent  relative prices right,
but consumers and producers perceive  that the reforms will not last and intertemporal
relative prices are accordingly  distorted, (p. 3)."
Also, stabilization  programs aimed at inducing  macroeconomic  stability  are crucial  for the
success  of several other components  of adjustment  programs. For instance, trade reforms require real
devaluation  of the currency in response  to the effects of reductions  in tariff and non-tariff  barriers.  In
an environment  of growing inflation (induced  by expansionary  fiscal policy) the real exchange  rate
becomes overvalued  leading to the reduction  of exports and to the decline in foreign exchange
revenues. This could in turn lead to a reversal of progress made on tariff reforms as the supply of
foreign exchange  dwindles.
The World Bank (1991c)  has noted that macroeconomic  stability  must be a top priority in the
development  process since the experience  of the 1970s  and 1980s  indicates  that such stability  is
crucial for durable and sustainable  economic  growth. Sound macroeconomic  policies create an
environment  which is hospitable for private investment  and the development  of entrepreneurship.
Such an environment  also helps to promote productivity. Given the importance  of macroeconomic
stability  for the success  of policy reforms in other areas and sectors, the World Bank constar.tly- 80 -
monitors  macroeconomic  indicators  such as public deficits, inflation  rate, interest rate on bank
deposits, and real exchange rates.  In most cases rapid progress in the implementation  of
macroeconomic  policies is a prerequisite for the release of second tranche.
B.2  Exchange Rate Reform
Exchange rate devaluation  has been a very important  component  of most adjustment  packages
in SSA.  There has been tremendous  progress made in exchange  rate adjustment. In the late 1970s
and early 1980s,  most countries  in SSA had overvalued  effective  real exchange  rates compared to
other  'developing  regions (Figure 4.1).  Between 1980-82  and 1987, the index  of real effective
exchange  rate had depreciated  by about 40 percent for SSA as a group.  Also, between 1987 and
1990, the real effective  exchange rate had depreciated  by another 14 percent.  Countries  with a
flexible and market-oriented  exchange  rate regime (such as Gambia, Ghana, Guinea and Madagascar)
have been very successful  at keeping  the degree of overvaluation  in their real exchange  rates at low
levels in the late 1980s (World Bank 1991a,  p. 9).
The rationale  for nominal devaluation  is simple. For a given set of fiscal and monetary
policies and economic  fundamentals,  a nominal devaluation  accelerates  the process of real exchange
rate convergence  towards its equilibrium  level.  Evidence  obtained by Edwards (1989) indicates  that
nominal exchange  rate devaluation  is a very powerful  tool in inducing  a depreciation  in the real
exchange  rate.  An overvaluation  of the real exchange  rate imposes  an implicit tax on exports and
hence discourages  the production  of exportable  goods. It also sets an implicit subsidy on imports  and
hence encourages  the latter, worsening  the current account balance. Hence, nominal devaluation  is a
very powerful tool in bringing about  an improvement  in the current account balance.
B.3  Trade Reform
In SSA, a development  strategy of industrialization  and import-substitution  in the 1960s  and
1970s  led to the establishment  of high import tariffs on competing  imports to protect infant industries.
Inward-oriented  trade policies affect production  incentives  in several ways:
*  High import tariffs and policies that protect the industry raise the cost of imported
inputs such as fertilizer, machines, tractors and spare parts.  This in turn lowers the
profitability  of the exportables  sector.
*  Export taxes lower domestic  prices relative to international  prices and hence reduce
the incentives  for producing  exportable  goods.-81  -
*  Excessive  inward-oriented  trade strategies  cause overvaluation  of the real exchange
rate and the resulting  implicit taxation  on exports lower incentives  to produce
exportable  goods.
*  The existence  of quantitative  restrictions (such as quotas), and import and export
licenses create opportunities  for rents and can divert resources from production
activities to rent-seeking  activities. Gallagher (1991) has shown that the existence  of
widespread  rent-seeking  activities  in SSA in the 1970s and 1980s  has slowed down
economic  growth in the region.
Trade reforms involve the elimination  of quantitative  import  restrictions or the replacement  of
such restrictions with tariffs; the reduction of very high import tariff rates; the replacement  of
cascaded  tariff structures with more uniform  tariff rates; and the reduction  of excessive  export  taxes.
The primary aim of trade reforms is to induce a shift in resources (investment  and labor) from the
production  of non-tradable  goods and inefficient  import-competing  activities  to the production of
tradable  goods and efficient import-substitution  activities.
However, trade reforms in SSA can meet with difficulties  for the following  reasons:
3  Most African countries  depend on a few (usually  one or two) agricultural  commodities
for their export revenues. Large declines in international  commodity  prices reduce
foreign exchange earnings. If such reductions  are drastic, and difficulties  are involved
in paying for imports,  governments  can reverse the magnitude  of the tariffs to their
pre-reform high levels and/or reinstall quantitative  import restrictions.
*  In many countries  vested interests in governments  resist efforts to reduce protection
for protected  import-competing  industries.
*  Government  administrators  of quantitative  trade restrictions may reap rents from such
rest¢  ictions and hence may resist reform.
The supply response from trade policy reforms can be enhanced  in the following  ways:
*  The announced  trade policy reforms must be made credible  by bold government
moves to implement  the reforms and by complementary  institutional  reforms to
support the new trade regime.
*  Complementary  reforms (in exchange  rate, financial sector, labor market, and
agricultural prices) should be carried out simultaneously  to induce a quick
mobilization  of resources  to the tradables  sector.- 82 -
Empirical studies indicate a strong and positive correlation  between outward-oriented  trade
strategies and rapid economic  growth. The 1991  World Development  Report finds that "...  there is a
positive association  between productivity  growth and trade and exchange  rate policy using seven
different measures  of openness  (World Bank 1991c, p. 98)."  Hence, given the fact that African
economies  are highly dependent  on foreign trade, trade reforms have the potential of inducing  large
benefits for them.
B.4  Agricultural Sector Reform
The macroeconomic  crisis in SSA has been very closely  related to the poor performance  in
agriculture. The agricultural sector remains  the backbone  of most countries  in the region. It employs
a large part of the labor force and it accounts  for a high proportion  of exports.  However, agriculture
has been neglected  in many countries. Since, the early 1980s  it has become clear that the first step to
economic  recovery in SSA is to build up and strengthen  the agricultural  sector.
Given the importance  of the agricultural  sector in SSA, about half of all SECALs  has been
geared to that sector in the period 1980-90. Agricultural  conditions  have been included  in a large
number  of SALs and other non-agricultural  SECALs. In many countries  (such as Guinea,  Malawi,
Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia  and Zaire) efforts have been made to liberalize  the marketing  and
pricing of agricultural  export commodities. Also, tremendous  progress has been made in changing
agricultural  policies and reforming  the agricultural institutional  framework in Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana,
Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritania  and Togo.
The idea underlying  policy reforms in agriculture is very simple. Once the major relative
prices (including  the real exchange rate and real interest rates) achieve  the "right" level, farmers and
other economic  agents are expected  to respond significantly  to the improved economic  environment.
They do so by mobilizing  scarce resources into productive  agricultural  activities and hence help
trigger and speed up the agricultural  growth  process.  However, there is some controversy  in the
supply response literature conceming  the magnitude  and speed of responsiveness  of agricultural output
to price incentives. There are those who believe  that agricultural  output is rather price inelastic  and
hence does not respond much  to price incentives. Many of these same observers  believe that there
are structural impediments  (such as weak supporting  institutions  and infrastructure)  constraining
supply response to price incentives. Thus, taxing agriculture either through lower agricultural  prices
or overvalued  real exchange  rates should not lower agricultural  output. However, there are those
who believe  that the aggregate  supply elasticity for agriculture is fairly elastic. Hence, direct and
indirect taxation  of agriculture is a direct taxation  on long-run economic  growth.
According  to a survey on agricultural  supply response  by Chhibber (1989), estimates  of
aggregate  supply elasticities  fall in a wide range. The estimates  from the cross-country  and general- 83 -
equilibrium  models  range between  0.9 and 1.66 indicating  that agricultural  output is not necessarily
price inelastic and hence correct price signals can trigger favorable aggregate  agricultural  supply
response. Cottani et al. (1990) and Ghura and Grennes (1991)  have shown that implicit taxation  of
the agricultural  sector through overvalued  real exchange  rates does indeed slow down agricultural and
overall growth.  Such a finding  seems to imply that agriculture  is indeed  price elastic. The available
low estimates  of aggregate  agricultural  supply elasticities  might be a reflection  of econometric  and
data problems. The "distributed  lag' approach  to measuring  agricultural  price elasticities  is a partial
equilibrium  approach  and does not account for factor movements  induced  by changes  in relative
prices (Valdes (1986), p.  161). A study on Argentina  using a general equilibrium  framework (by
Cavallo and Mundlak 1982)  finds agriculture  to be quite responsive  to changes  in price - an implied
elasticity of 0.9 is obtained. Also, Balassa  (1990) found a price elasticity  of 1.35 for agricultural
exports in SSA.
Thomas and Chhibber  (1989)  have argued that improved  price incentives  will enhance
agricultural supply response  only if the fundamental  bottlenecks  in agriculture  are eliminated  and if
non-price measures  are taken.  Hence, agricultural  price reforms need to be complemented  by:
- technological  innovations  which provide high-yielding  seed varieties, for instance;
- investments  in infrastructure  such as feeder roads and irrigation  and flood control
systems;
*  improved  availability  of inputs such as seeds, fertilizer and equipment;
*  increased availability  of agricultural research and extension;
*  increased  availability  of credit and marketing  services; and
*  reforms of the institutional  and regulatory frameworks.
Given the importance  of the agricultural  sector in SSA, the benefits from an improved policy
environment  has the potential  of generating  large benefits for thle  overall economy.
B.5  Finandal  Sector Reform
In the context  of SSA, much less emphasis  has been put on the financial  sector reform
(compared  with other parts of the world).  However, financial  sector reforms have grown in
importance  over time in SSA.  Only 5 percent of the adjustment  programs constituted  financial-sector
specific reforms in the period 1980-85. This share rose to 8 percent in the period 1986-87  and to 11
percent in the period 1988-90  (Hettige  et al. 1991, p.  16).
A dynamic financial  sector and an efficient  financial intermediation  are important
characteristics  of fast growing developing  economies  (such as Korea, Singapore  and Malaysia). The- 84 -
smooth functioning  of the financial  sector is an important  precondition  for the success  of adjustment
programs. Casual observation  suggests  that countries  with "deeper" financial  sectors (measured  by
M2/GNP) have adjusted  to the severe external shocks  of the early 1980s  faster and grown more
rapidly than those with "shallow"  financial  sectors.  The financial  system performs certain important
functions  in the development  process of a nation. It serves as an intermediary  between savings and
borrowers of these saved resources. Also, an efficient financial  system reduces both costs and risks
associated with lending  activities.
However, the financial  sector in SSA has remained  small, underdeveloped  and inadequate  for
the development  needs of the real sector for the following  reasons:
*  For a long period of time, governments  considered  it important  to promote economic
development  by controlling  interest rates, providing  subsidized  credit to (perceived)
priority sectors, and securing scarce inexpensive  funding  for their own activities
(World Bank 1989c,  p.  1).  Commnercial  banks and other financial  intermediaries  were
pressured by governments  to make loans to priority sectors such as import-substitution
industries  at (low) interest rates.  Also, low interest rates paid to depositors  did not
encourage savings.
*  Most of the few existing formal financial institutions  have been concentrated  in the
urban areas and hence credit availability  has been scarce in the rural areas.
*  Since lenders have provided loans mainly to wealthier  enterprises, small firms have
encountered  tremendous  difficulty  in obtaining funds  for the financing  of small
businesses.
*  In many countries  public borrowing  from the central bank (often)  financed  by money
creation  has fueled expected  inflation  which in turn has caused the real interest rates
on deposits to become negative. For most of the period between 1967-85,  the real
interest rates in SSA were negative  ai  much lower than most other developing
regions (World Bank 1989c, p  65).  Negative  real interest rates discourage  the
holding  of financial  assets as savers find it more rewarding  to invest in real assets or
to transfer funds abroad.
With the drying up of foreign  capital inflows  in SSA in the 1980s, countries  in the region
will have to depend more on domestic resources to finance investment  and development. Hence,
financial  sector reforms are important  since they aim to improve  the efficiency  of financial
intermediation  and the use of credit resources, including  the allocation  of investment  (Corbo and
Fischer 1991, p. 13). Reforms of the financial sector involve attempts  to allow the private sector and- 85  -
market forces determine  the allocation  of limited and scarce financial resources. In this context, the
banking system is encouraged  to remove subsidies  and controls in order to allow domestic interest
rates to reflect market conditions  more closely.
Two factors are crucial  for financial sector reform:
*  First, overall price stability is important  for the successful  development  of financial
markets because of the linkages  between  expected  inflation  and the real interest rates.
Hence, financial  liberalization  needs to be coupled  with macroeconomic  policy
reforms and price stability. Experience  suggests  that countries  that attempted  financial
liberalization  before undertaking  other reforms have suffered destabilizing  capital
flows, high interest rates, and corporate  distress (World  Bank 1989c, p. 5).  In
countries  that have maintained  low and stable inflation  through prudent monetary and
fiscal policies, financial  sector growth has been rapid, even where interest rates were
(moderately)  regulated  (World Bank 1989c, p. 64).
*  Second, there needs to be a suitable institutional  framework  and accountability  system
to help in the development  of the financial  sector.  In many African countries, the
legal, accounting  and auditing systems  have to be overhauled  to define and enforce
laws concerning  property rights, contracts, collateral  and foreclosure. Countries  also
need to create appropriate  financial institutions,  develop better systems of pr'idential
regulation  and supervision, improve the flow of financial  information,  develop human
skills for managing  complex  financial  operations (World  Bank 1989c, p. 5).
B.6  Public Enterprise Reform
Public enterprise reform has been an important  component  of recent SECALs in SSA (World
Bank 1990a, p. 42).  At the time the adjustment  process was initiated, many countries  in SSA had
either overextended  public enterprise  sectors (Ghana, Madagascar,  Mauritania,  and Zambia)  or public
infrastructural  development  commitments  (Cote d'Ivoire, Kenya, Nigeria, and Togo) programs that
weighed  heavily on the government  budget (Hettige  et al. 1991, p. 1).  Consequently,  public sector
reforms have received much emphasis  in SSA - more than in other regions.
Public sector reforms include  the following  measures:
*  inducing  curtailment  of overextended  public sectors and overhaul  of loss making
parastatals  (e.g. marketing  boards) since they add to the budget deficits;
*  increasing  the efficiency  and profitability  of state-owned  enterprises  by restructuring
incentives  for managers;- 86 -
*  allowing competition  from private (including  foreign)  firms - such as in Ghana,
Kenya and Malawi;
*  encouraging  and allowing  the private sector to perform activities it does best (e.g.
marketing  of agricultural commodities)  and allowing  the state to focus on managing
the macroeconomy  and at providing  basic educational,  scientific  and health services
and providing  infrastructure;  and
*  enabling more adequate  pricing of state enterprise  output - prices of tradable  goods
should reflect international  prices and prices of non-traded  goods of public enterprises
(e.g electricity)  should reflect  social marginal  costs.
The ultimate  objectives  of economic  policy reform programs are to promote economic  growth
and raise the welfare of the poor.  By sending the appropriate  price signals to reflect the relative
scarcity of capital, policy reforms encourage  the use of more labor-intensive  production  techniques
which provide work for the poor.  Policies  that improve  the efficiency  and internal terms-of-trade  for
agriculture  can improve the income of the poor.  Efforts towards economic  policy reforms in SSA
need to be complemented  by institution  building and human capital  development. Institutions  need to
be  strengthened  so that they can be more effective  in responding  to the needs of producers, traders
and consumers. The provision of social services  (especially  primary education,  nutrition and basic
health care, and family planning)  to the poor is important  to help enhance  the productivity  of labor.
There is no doubt that many countries in SSA have been the victim of forces outside  their
control  - declining  terms-of-trade,  drying up of foreign capital inflows, prolonged  periods of
droughts and the accompanying  ravage on soil quality and soil erosion. However, empirical  studies
suggest that inappropriate  domestic policies (over-expansionary  monetary and fiscal policies, excessive
inward-oriented  trade strategies and policies encouraging  excessive  capital inflows)  have been very
important  in slowing down macroeconomic  and sectoral performance  in SSA. Hence, domestic policy
reforms can stimulate  the engine of growth in these economies. Policy reforms in general, and
policies designed  to maintain  the real exchange  rate near its equilibrium  level, in particular, can
provide considerable  stimulus  to the recovery  of growth, saving, investment,  and trade.  Given the
importance  of the agricultural sector in most African economies,  the improvement  of agricultural
price incentives  offers the potential  of large benefits.- 87 -
APPENDIX C:  OVERVIhEW  OF THE DATA
The data used in the analysis  are taken from the World Bank's ANDREX  data base, except
for the real effective exchange  rate data which come from the IMF.  Five indicators of performance
are considered:  rate of growth of real GDP; ratio of saving to GDP; ratio of investment  to GDP; ratio
of export to GDP; and domestic inflation. The sample contains  observations  from 45 low income
countries  during the period 1970-89,  a period for which data were available  for all relevant
macroeconomic  variables when the study was started (see Table A.  1 for a list of countries  included in
the study). Following Corbo and Rojas (1991), the performance  indicators in the period 1985-89  18
(a period after adjustment  was initiated)  are compared  with those in 1981-84  (the decision  period) for
countries in SSA and low-income  countries (LICs). 1 9 Each of these two groups of countries  were
divided into three categories: early intensive adjustment  lending (EIAL) countries that received  two or
more SALs or three or more adjustment  loans (SALs or SECALs),  starting in 1985  or before; other
adjustment  lending (OAL) countries  that started a program after 1985  or received fewer than two
SALs or fewer than three adjustment  loans in 1985  or before; and non adjustment  lending (NAL)
countries that did not receive adjustment  loans.
Both constant and current series were used.  Most ELAL  countries carried out a real
depreciation  in 1985-89. Thus, the relative price of investment  goods and exports rose relative to the
early 1980s. Therefore, to measure  the contribution  of growth in the supply response  of exports, it is
better to work with GDP and export to GDP ratios in constant  prices.  For completeness  and to
satisfy the adding up condition, the savings  ratios at constant  prices were also used.  In the empirical
analysis  two categories  of countries were defined: (i) program countries  consisting  of the ELAL
countries; and (ii) a "control" group consisting  of the non-program  (OAL and NAL) countries. The
OAL countries were considered  non-program  countries  because  they received  too few adjustment
loans during the period analyzed.
The time period was divided as follows: 1970-80  (first), 1981-84  (second)  and 1985-89
(third), with the latter corresponding  to the adjustment  period. A comparison  was made of the
program countries' performance  in the third period with respect  to some counterfactual  scenario of
what would have happened in the absence  of an adjustment  program.  Simple  period averages of the
Is It is argued that the period 198549 (or 1986-89)  iB  the appropriate  period  to assess the effect  of structural  adjustment
progamms  on economic  performance. Examination  of perfurmance  indicators  one or two years after the initiation  of an
adjustment  effort reveals  little about the effectivenoss  of an adjustment  program,  since  the first phase  of reform  will be
dominated  by the stabilization  effort needed  for ostablishing  a credible  macroeconomic  environment,  before  stuctural reforms
to improve  resource  alocation  and restore growth  can be started  (swe  Corbo  and Rojas 1991).
19  The LICs  are normally  defined  to be the group eligible  for the World  Bank  IDA lending. In addition  to these  countries,  we
include  six rniddle  income  countries  for SSA:  Botswana,  Cameroon,  Congo,  Cote d'lvoirm,  Mauritius  and Zimbabwe  to the
group of LICs.- 88 -
following  five indicators were used: rate of GDP growth, inflation  and the ratios of gross domestic
savings, gross investment  and exports to GDP.  Thus, for each country  j, there is an observation  for
variable i in periods one, two and three.
Following is a list of variables  used in the analysis:2
Five Indicat
GDP  Rate of real GDP growth
GDI_  Gross investment  to GDP ratio
GDS_  Gross domestic  saving to GDP ratio
X_  Export to GDP ratio
INFL  CPI inflation
INT_  Internal shock 21
EXT  External  shock
CAB  Current account balance  to GDP ratio
DEBT_  Total debt to GDP ratio
REER  Real effective  exchange  rate
TOT_  Terms of trade
Dummy Varif  t  A  n  h
AFR  1 if country  is African, 0 otherwise
LAC  I if country is Latin American, O  otherwise
ASIA  1 if country is Asian, 0 otherwise
MIC  1 if country is middle-income,  0 otherwise
PROG  1 if country is was an early intensive
adjustment  country, 0 otherwise
2  Tho numbers  conespond  to the period. For example,  GDP2  is the rate of growth  of real GDP in period  2, and DEBT21  is
h  change  in extenal debt between  periods  two and one.
2u Tih inteal  shock variable  was constucted  by regressing  cereal  yield  on a time  trend and multiplying  the predicted  yield by
tho shae of agniulture in GDP.- 89  -
Table  A.1:  Country  Classification
1.  EIAL (Early Intensive-Adjustment-Lending  Countries)  (14)
Bolivia  Mauritius






II.  OAL (Other Adjustment-Lending  Countries)  (16)
Bangladesh  Guyana
Burkina Faso  Mali
Burundi  Nlger
Central African Republic  Sierra Leone
China, People's Republic of  Somalia
Congo, People's Republic of  Sudan
Guinea  Zaire
Guinea-Bissau  Zimbabwe




Ethiopia  Sri Lanka
Haiti  Yemen Arab Rep.
India
Notes:
EIAL are countries that have received 2 SALs or 3 adjustment
Operation or more, with the first adjustnent operation in 1985
or before.
OAL are other countries receiving adjustment lending.
NAL are countries that did not receive  AL In  the period 1980 to 1988.
The sample Includes Stib-Saharan African  countries and other Low income
countries.  The control group in the Modified-Control-Group method
includes EIAL countries.-90  -
APPENDIX D:  THE STATISTICAL FRAMEWORK
An adequate  framework for estimating  the marginal contribution  of the program effect should
adjust for initial conditions  and exogenous non-program  factors.  In addition, the methodology  must
explicitly  consider  policy reactions  and hence the endogeneity  of policy instruments. More importantly,
this methodology  should allow for correction  of the "sample  selectivity"  bias that results from the non-
randomness  of the decision to undertake reform.
The problem of selectivity  bias arises in evaluating  the impact of economic  reform on average
economic  performance (e.g.,  growth in real GDP), when the average performance of the program
countries  would  differ from that of the non-program  countries  even  in the absence  of program. Formally,
if  yf t  stands for economic  performance  of country i at period t in the absence  of program, and if di
is an indicator  variable  equal to one if i is a program country  and equal to zero otherwise;  then selectivity
bias implies  the following:
E(yft  I di  =  1)  ¢  E(yAt  I  dC  =  0).
The above interpretation  of the selection  bias problem  borrows from the literature  on the impact  of social
programs.22  The strand of the literature that exploits  non-experimental  data (as in the present case) has
produced  rather non-uniform  predictions  regarding  the effectiveness  of social  programs. In a recent paper
analyzing the effectiveness  of training programs, Heckman and Hotz (1989) argue that "evidence  of
striking differences  in estimates  produced  from alternative  non-experimental  estimators  merely confirms
the existence  of systemic  differences  between  trainees and comparison  group members in characteristics
affecting  outcome  measures." Also, the different  non-experimental  estimators  make different  assumptions
about the distribution of these differences.  Based on this, Heckman and Hotz (1989) then go on to
develop  a family of models  that resolve  the selection  bias problem  under varying  identification  conditions.
They also develop formal tests for choosing among alternative  non-experimental  estimators, subject  to
data availability.
In what follows the Heckman  and Hotz (1989)  paradigm will be used to develop two types of
estimators that permit identification  of program effect under two different sets of assumptions. The
current model also draws on Rojas and Serven (forthcoming)  which incorporates a policy reaction
function in the standard selection  bias problem studied  in the social program literature.
22 For example  Hockman  and Hotz (1989)  and th litertr  cited  tohein.- 91 -
As  a starting  point  the basic  specification  for the macro  economic  target  variable  are  stated  in equation
(1) below.
Yis  =  0&O  + X;V  ajl  +  K8  a2  +  v.  + ej,,ss  (1A)
y1t  = a 0 + XAt4 1 + Wta 2 +  O3di  + vi  + eit  t  >  K  (IB)
where  x  is the decision  period pertaining  to program  participation  Xi, is a  x  -element  vector of the
macroeconomic  policy instruments  that would be observed  by  country i  in period t  under the
circumstances  of non-participation  posture,  WI,  is an M-element  -andom  vector  of the world  variables  not
related  to program  participation  and  relevant  to country  i and  period  t, di is a dummy  variable  that  takes
the value  of unity  if the country  participates  in the  Bank-supported  reform  and  zero  otherwise,  the prime
(') sign  denotes  the transpose  of a vector,  v, is a time  invariant  country  specific  random  effect,  and  eh  is
an iid disturbance  shock  uncorrelated  across  time and  across  individual  countries.
In equation  (1), the target  variable  y;,  is a function  of (a) the value of the selected  policy
instruments  that would  have  occurred  assuming  non-participation  (a counterfactual),  Xi,;  (b) a change  in
selected  world  economic  conditions,  Wi,;  (c)  the  total  effects  of program  participation,  d,;  and  (d) a range
of unobservable  random  shocks,  vi and e,.
The policy  vector  x is generated  according  to the following  reaction  function:
AX 1 t  =  [Yst  - yi,t-_]  I  81  +  WIit  62  +  n 1 +  (st  (2)
where  y dt  is  the  desired value of  the matrix Y;, of  the  individual economic  indicators,
yi a,,;  and  n1 and  eit  are random  effects  as in (1) above.  Following  Rojas and Serven
(forthcoming),  ,t and  are allowed  to have  a non-zero  correlation  for i  j and t =  s, but are
assumed  uncorrelated  in all other  cases. In turn, v; and  ni,  can be correlated  for any given  i.
The reaction  function  (2) reflects  policy  makers'  response  to perceived  disequilibria  in the  target
variables. It shows  that a change  in policy  instruments  between  any two periods  is a function  of the
difference  between  the desired  value  of the target  variable  in the current  period  and its actual  value  in
the preceding  period, a change  in the world  economic  environment,  a time invariant  country  specific-92-
random  shock ni  and  a disturbance  term  l  The vector  of the coefficients  of responsiveness
to target  disequilibria  is 6.  One  potential  limitation  of this model  is that the reaction  function  can be
highly  unstable  and in the extreme  case  deriving  the counterfactuals  becomes  insoluble  problem  (e.g.,
Goldstein  and  Montiel  1986).
Since  yfd,  is unobservable,  it is assumed  that  the desired  target  levels  depend  on last period
policy  stance  and actual  target  levels,  in addition  to current  exogenous  world  environment.  Hence,  the
reaction  function  can be written  in the following  unrestricted  reduced  form:
Xit  = bo  +  W;t  b1 +  X;,t-l  b2 +  Y;,  -.  b3 +  n,  +  elt  (3)
The model  is completed  by adding  a framework  describing  the decision  by countries  to undertake
economic  reform. The participation  decision  can  be specified  in terms  of an index  function  framework.
Let the index,  IN;  be a function  of both  observed  variables  (Z.)  -- which  may  include  all of the elements
in the vector  Xi  - and unobserved  variables  (  gt  ), that is,
'IN  V  fftZf)  +  (4)
where  f(.) is an unspecified  function  of Z;.  Then  the iP country's  program  status  is given  by:
1  if  and  only  if  IN 1 >  0  (5
di  {o otherwise
Now abstracting  from (4) and (5) for a moment,  subtract  (1A) from (IB) and use (3) to obtain  the
following  estimating  equation  for program  effect:
Yl-t  Y 19 =  (Wit  - W 1s)  'PI3 +  (Xi,C. 1 - X1 ,s-1)  '12
+  (Yi,t-l  - Y1,8- 1 )  103 +  A 4 d
+  (e1 t  - e18)  +  P5(e  -t  - els)  (6)
where as before  t  >  K  and s  <  K  and  K  is the decision  period pertaining  to program
participation.- 93 -
The above equation,  whjii.,  lows the elimination  of the permarient  random  shocks  vi and  ni,
provides the structure that will be combined  with the sets of identification  conditions  in order to derive
the two estimators  of the program effect. Note that since t-l  >  s, the presence  of e  and  tg  in (6)
implies that the terms (YI  ,., - Yi,.,) and (Xi,.,l  - X1,,.)  are endogenous. This rather classical source of
endogeneity  should also be corrected  for along with the one caused  by the selection  bias pro:  -n.
Before  going on to discuss individual  estimators,  the following  general assumption  is made. The
dependence  between  ea,  and di arises because  of the dependence  between  p,  and ea. More formally
E(e 1.jd1 ,  X..,  W 1,)  o  O  and
E(etId 1,  Xt,  wit,  Z1)  0  o  but
E(elt1ids  X,t,  Wits, Zj)  =E(eitlXICO  Wit,  z1)  (7)
This case is referred to by Heckman  and Hotz (1989)  as "selection  on unobservables"%
D.1  First Difference Estimator
This estimator  is obtained  by adding  to equation (6) and assumption  (7) the assumption  that the
conditional  expectation  of the difference  in a pre- and post- program set of e,t's does not depend on di.
That is, it is assumed  that the following  condition  holds:
E(e.jt  - e,,1d,,  .R,, W1)  = 0  (8A)
for all t, s, where t >  k >  s, and  2R  is an instrumented  vector of Xft'sY  For this model consistent
estimates  of the impact  of program  can be obtained  by estimating  equation  (6) using 2SLS  or IV methods
with di and (WI - Wj) taken as the exogenous  regressors.
2 The "selecdon  on observables-  cas  which  is not vey  rlevant to the problen at hand is not considered  here.  See Heckman
and Hotz for moe details  on this.
24 Specification  (8A) can be motivated  by assuming  that selection  occurs  on the permanent  component,  v,  of the composite
disturbance  term (v 1 + a5) of equation  (1), and ek is a zero non-madom  componant  independent  of ei,  for t > k>  >.- 94 -
D.2  Modified-Control-Group  Estimator
This approach  requires  an assumption  giving  specific  functional  specification  to the program  status
in equation (4).  In addition to equation (6) and condition  (7) assume that:
f(Zi)  =  z1 y
Pi-  L  id  from the distribution  F(g)  Pr (pi  < Ai)
and  E(IJ, 1 Z1)  = 0  (8B)
Now assumption  (SB)  allows us to write:
P.r(d,  Lz 1Z)  = E(dilZ1 )  s1  - F(-Ziy)  (8B')
The probability  statement  (8B') provides a basis for estimating  (using a probit model (e.g., Corbo and
Rojas 199l),5 an instrument  al =  1  - F( -Z.)  for di.  The second step is to estimate equation
(6) using 2SLS or IV as in (A) above but with  di  (rather than d.) and (wk  - W.) taken as exogenous
regressors.
Note that for the first difference  estimator,  the identification  condition  is an assumption  about  the
moments  of the  performance  equation's disturbance  term. In this case, identification  of marginal  program
effect is possible without the need to specify the decision rule.  However, the estimator used in the
Modified-Control-Group  analysis requires specific functional and distributional specification of  the
program participation  decision  process, but the random disturbance  shocks to performance  are allowed
to be more general.  These two estimators  should  provide an opportunity  for assessing  the robustness  of
the results.  In addition to testing for conventional  endogeneity  as suggested  by the model, the validity
of both assumptions  using pre-program  data is formally tested.
25  See also  Bamow  . (1981),  and  Heckman  (1979).- 95 -
Table  B.1.  Modified  Control-Group  Estimates  of Program  Effects  for
Low Income  Countries
(Constant  Prices)  1985-89  Relative  to 1981-84-
*  :i  Change  '  n.D  ent  Variable
... '''  "':DP  . %  D P  S a v i  .;  D  EP por  tflti  O  ""
Regressors
C  0.163  0.350  0.201
(4.363)  (3.952)  (2.905)
ODP2  -1.011  .0.628  ..  0.433  . 0.905
(-8.642)  (-2.605)  ..  (2.267)  (2.334)
GD12  0.144  ..  0.161  -0.067  -0.226
(3.103)  ..  (1.196)  (-1.07T  (-1.578)
GDS2  ..  ..  .0.206  -0.043  -0.058
(-4.393)  (-1.428)  (-1.486)
X2  -0.085  -0.196  -0.089  0.070
(.3.289)  (-3.714)  (.1.351)  (1.475)
INFL2  ..  ..  -0.027  ..  0.257
(-2.938)  ..  (1.265)
DEF2  ..  ..  ..  ..  -0.482
(-1.060)
REER2  -0.000  -0.001  ..  0.000  -0.001
(-1.308)  (-2.298)  ..  (1.548)  (-1.799)
TOT2  -1.001  -0.002  -0.001
(.3.443)  (-4.366)  (.2.851)
INT32  0.007  ..  ..  ..  -0.125
(1.627)  ..  ..  . . (.2.415)
EXT32  0.068  0.140  0.534
(2.531)  (1.999)  (5.365)
POL86  -0.009  -0.011  .0.013  -0.008  0.016
(.3.545)  (-1.232)  (.1.650)  (-2.148)  (1.586)
LAC  -0.033  ..  ..  ..  0.125
(4.405)  *-  *-  ..  (0.813)
AFR  ..  0.028
(1.587)
MIC  ..  ..  0.028
(0.887)
PROGHAT  0.001  .0.053  -0.017  0.026  0.026
(0.110)  (-1.906) *  (-0.691)  (1.570)  *t  (0.383)
*  Statistically  significant  at  tLe 105to  level
**  Statistically  significant  at  the 12%  level- 96  -
Table  B.2.  Modified  Control-Group  Estimates  of Program  Effects  for
Sub-Saharan  Africa
(Constant  Prices)  1985-89  relative  to 1981-84
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.  .. ..,_....  ... .. .. 
D,detVariable
Change  in.  Change  min  Change:  in  hage  . Chng 
GPgro  t:1vsmtGPSvnlD  xpor~sGP.::  nltd
Regressors
C  0.192  0.319  0.269
(5.492)  (3.907)  (3.514):.
GDP2  -1.129  -0.745  *0.742  0.745  1.732
(.9.739)  (-2.373)  (-1.402)  (2.217)  (2.299)
GD12  0.194  -0.167  0.234  -0.066  -0.231
(3.757)  (-1.387)  (1.461)  (-0.587)  (-1.647)
GDS2  0.042  ..  .0.150  -0.071  -0.133
(2.551)  (.2.293)  (-2.075)  (-2.191)
X2  -0.090  -0.118
(-2.604)  (-1.643)
INFL2  ..  -0.126  ..  -0.057  0.337
(-2.430)  ..  (-1.002)  (1.750)
DEF2  ..  -0.017
(-1.213)
REER2  -0.000  ..  ..  0.000  -0.002
(-1.420)  ..  ..  (0.866)  (-1.857)
TOT2  -0.001  -0.001  .0.001  0.000
(-3.702)  (-2.990)  (-1.828)  (0.806)
L4T32  0.011  0.016  ..  ..  -0.170
(1.725)  (1.009)  ..  ...  (-2.786)
EXT32  0.108  0.108  0.600  -0.115  .
(3.594)  (1.534)  (5.214)  (-1.495)
POL86  -0.013  -0.016  -0.030  -0.013  0.022
(-3.819)  (-1.139)  (.3.059)  (-1.910)  (1.749)
MIC  -0.019  ..  ..  ..  -0.072
(-1.482)  ..  ..  ..  (-1.353)
PROGHAT  -0.014  -0.084  -0.083  0.080  0.122
(-0.830)  (.2.314)  *  (-1.574)  **  (2.459) *  (1.244) 
*  Statistically significant at the  5%  level
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